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RHETORIC AND REALITY IN PENAL REFORM
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It is remarkable how much excitement a prime minister talking about prison creates in the penal lobby. Claiming 20 years since a PM had spoken on the topic and yet with no recognition that he has been PM for well over five years of that time promises of reform abound in his speech.

'I believe prison reform should be a great progressive cause in British politics, and (I) set out my vision for a modern, more effective, truly twenty-first century prison system.' (Cameron, 2016)

Stirring words but given the government obsession with austerity this cannot be an announcement with extra money to improve this barren part of our creaking and frankly unacceptably failing penal system. The main irony lies in the fact that it is arguable that it is the Government’s own policies amid public sector cost cutting which has placed the prison system in such jeopardy. The language of rehabilitation and reform are replete though throughout the speech:

'we need a prison system that doesn’t see prisoners as simply liabilities to be managed, but instead as potential assets to be harnessed.' (Cameron, 2016)

This has been the rhetorical tone of most criminal justice change in the last five years including the ill-fated TR (Transforming Rehabilitation) programme producing a bifurcated and hapless set of arrangements for probation. As Dunt suggests the installation of Chris Grayling as Justice Secretary 'who ran a mind-bogglingly wrong-headed penal policy.' (Dunt, 2016) has sent the prison system in a decidedly wrong direction under Cameron. Rather than support the good practice ideas which had fledging potential under Kenneth Clarke in the early Coalition Government of 2010, the removal of Clarke and five years under Grayling feels like a salvage operation is now urgently required for a system on its knees - job cuts, staffing crises (number of full-time public sector prison staff fell by 29% between March 2010 and Dec 2014), absence of employability activities within the prison, scandals in parts of the system, inmates in constant lock ups, little or no education, increased suicides, increased numbers, overcrowding - tackling all these issues may be
needed first before growth and development can be achieved. Indeed with a disarming distancing Cameron appears to recognise the parlous state of the prison system:

'current levels of prison violence, drug-taking and self-harm should shame us all. In a typical week, there will be almost 600 incidents of self-harm; at least one suicide; and 350 assaults, including 90 on staff.'

'Prisons aren’t a holiday camp - not really. They are often miserable, painful environments. Isolation. Mental anguish. Idleness. Bullying. Self-harm. Violence. Suicide. These aren’t happy places. It’s lazy to subscribe to the idea that prisoners are somehow having the time of their lives. These establishments are full of damaged individuals.' (Cameron, 2016)

Most commentators have focused on this apparent dissonance between the impact of the government's own policies and the apparent concern of the PM to tackle the very problems that they have been culpable in creating. Can tinkering at the margins really deal with the systematic problems at the heart of delivering a prison system which appears broken and unable to cope even in survival mode rather than ready for the expansion and transformation suggested - 'we can be world leaders in change' (Cameron, 2016), particularly when there appears to be no resources to achieve such changes?

Two key policy reforms on prisons have been expressed by most critiques of this speech as prerequisites for any tinkering of the current system to have any impact at all - sentencing reform and acceptance of the need for enhancement of budgets to return prison to a functioning operation. In the past 20 years only Kenneth Clarke recognised that reducing the prison population was not only the right way to go but doing so would create the space to do something effective with those that remained behind. But Cameron has to produce answers whilst reiterating the rhetoric which has effectively neutered any attempts to achieve such reductions since the 1980s. This is dismissed:

'you won’t hear me arguing to neuter judges’ sentencing powers or reduce their ability to use prison when it is required.' (Cameron, 2016).

Politically this is no surprise as the need to maintain this rhetorical hawkish response has echoed around the system and the occasional progressive ministers such as Whitelaw and more recently Clarke have rarely survived this punitive lobby long. It is surprising that Cameron appears to be claiming that the executive must not interfere with the judiciary and maintain this independence which the British legal system would claim is at the heart of the system. Yet calls since Thatcher and including Blair as well as Cameron for tougher sentencing has fundamentally changed the sentencing practices of sentencers. More people go to prison for longer and this has undoubtedly almost doubled the prison numbers in that time. The claim that most prisoners need to be there which accompanies this rhetoric is not borne out by the evidence from the penal lobby and the voluntary sector working in prisons or prison research itself. One commentator on this speech put it simply:
'For 80 per cent of our current prison population, prison is a bad idea. They are there not because they are a danger to the public, but because they are socially inadequate.' (Treadwell, 2016)

There are many that simply do not need to be there. Even an arch right wing state such as Texas in USA can reduce its prison population drastically becomes the economics demanded it, it is a politically viable option with no evidence that this will produce a more lawless community. Cameron at one level appears to see this argument:

'the truth is that simply warehousing ever more prisoners is not financially sustainable, nor is it necessarily the most cost-effective way of cutting crime.' (Cameron, 2016)

Actions - such as restricting the inappropriate use of custody - though do not follow through on this rhetoric. Beyond the needless use of custody there is the inappropriate use of custody for those with mental health issues, for most women, for most young offenders. Well-rehearsed evidenced arguments from Corston, from Bradley and from youth justice support this necessary plank of reform. The growing critique of the failure of the prison system highlighted by the outgoing Chief Inspector of Prison, Nick Hardwicke, are an indictment on five years of worsening policies and practice in the prison system.

'It remains my view that staff shortages, overcrowding and the wider policy changes described in this report have had a significant impact on prison safety.' (Hardwicke, quoted in Dunt, 2016)

Yet Cameron attempts a new conjuring trick. He seemingly acknowledges this situation but omits to make a direct link and then focuses on four strands drawn from his government's wider approach to social welfare which describe for him his successful reform of other public sector agencies:

'One: give much greater autonomy to the professionals who work in our public services, and allow new providers and new ideas to flourish...
Two: hold these providers and professionals to account with real transparency over outcomes...
Three: intervene decisively and dramatically to deal with persistent failure, or to fix the underlying problems people may have...
Four: use the latest behavioural insights evidence and harness new technology to deliver better outcomes.' (Cameron, 2016)

It is beyond the scope of this editorial to analyse each element but this myopia about the negative impact of such approaches belies this apparent reform agenda. Drawing on these 'successes' the solution is to give autonomy to the prison governor in the style of school academies. As he states:

'We are going to give prison governors unprecedented operational and financial autonomy, and be trusted to get on and run their jail in the way
they see fit. They’ll be given a budget and total discretion over how to spend it.’ (Cameron, 2016)

This autonomy may well be welcomed by governors whose autonomy has been severely neutered over the past 20 years. But with freedom, in this government, comes negative accountability. So league tables, outcome based metrics of assessment will dominate and in this situation governors may well become motivated not on reformatory goals per se but how their prison can hit government outcomes to secure resources. These perverse outcomes may not change the overall climate except perhaps to the six new reform prisons which will no doubt be subtly resourced to give a sheen of success.

Even if reform can be achieved in the prison system it is crucial that the period following release is effectively handled. In a strange alliance a joint article by Gove and Grayling points to the solution here:

‘We radically reformed the probation service so when offenders leave prison they are given the best possible support to return to society and start to rebuild their lives; making a contribution rather than going back to criminality.’ (Gove and Grayling, 2016)

The next issue of BJCI (14:1), to be published in late April, will focus on the impact of TR and seek to look forward to probation in 2020 (http://www.cjp.org.uk/events/cjp-lectures/cjp-lecture-2016/). It is right to make the connection between what goes on in prison and effective community reintegration. Much research points to the crucial nature of this link. But asserting the success of such reintegration is not the same as achieving it. The jury is out in this yet as the jury surely must be on Cameron’s grand ideas for prison reform!

There are four articles in this edition which tackle diverse aspects of criminal justice.

Steele applies the logic of rational choice decision making to a sample of offenders to explore how far decisions to commit crime are reflective of this theoretical orientation. The study reveals a rather more varied motivational scheme behind decides to offend. These implications are interrogated. Given that each individual will be operating under differing environments with differing motivations and levels of stress, then the author argues the decision making landscape of each individual will be unique.

Lowe et al. focus on the needs of victims in criminal justice asking key questions about the degree of access that victims actually have to support services such as Victim Support following the commission of a crime. This study which took place in 2013-14 reveals a low take up of around 2% in the study area and little impact on revictimisation. The study highlights the nature of support for victims at a time of reduced resources and changes from central government to PCCs in handling these services.

Turner and Johnston examine the release and aftercare of female prisoners in England during the late nineteenth century reflecting upon aftercare and residential provision for women leaving prison. The research uncovers a rather different experience of release
from those coming out of local prisons for which a quick return either to prison, workhouse or homelessness was a constant vicious cycle to those released from convict prisons in London and the South East who through Victorian philanthropy could be supported into new work roles such as domestic servitude. A fascinating exploration which has relevance for our treatment of women today leaving prison.

Crassati and Quartey report on research on the frequency and nature of third party disclosures on registered sex offenders in five London boroughs, with reference to the method of disclosure, the outcome, and subsequent offence failures. The authors point to the importance of disclosure and its potential as a powerful tool for risk management, highlighting the crucial areas of public protection and the needs of victims. This study provided an opportunity to ensure that disclosure decisions are consistent across areas and between agencies, and raises good practice ideas to ensure positive outcomes for both offenders and victims.
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HOW OFFENDERS MAKE DECISIONS: EVIDENCE OF RATIONALITY

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Abstract
This paper examines the results of a study which set out to ascertain applicability of Rational Choice Theories of offending to offenders’ actual experiences. The Rational Choice perspective views the offender as a reasoning individual who weighs up potential costs and benefits of a crime. Though subject to criticism, this approach is influential as part of the dominant ethos of the Criminal Justice system in England and Wales. Despite this, studies examining actual offending experiences rather than a student or non-offending population are relatively rare. Forty six offenders were interviewed, with mixed offending backgrounds. Results suggest that rationality can be seen to vary both within and between individuals and within and between offence types. Suggestions are made as to how an offenders' motivation can affect their ability to make a decision, and how these motivations can be understood in the context of the offence.

Keywords
Decision making; acquisitive; violent; Rational Choice.
Introduction

The Rational Choice approach to crime is closely aligned with the dominant ethos of the Criminal Justice System in England and Wales (Jones, 2008). The current UK criminal justice system essentially sees an individual as responsible for his or her actions, and applies punishment as a deterrent for engaging in illegal behaviour (Sutherland & Cressey, 1974). The Rational Choice Theoretical approach has at its core an assumption that a decision to offend takes place, and that such a decision is taken by a reasoning and (at least minimally) rational individual, weighing up the costs and benefits of the action. This view of individuals as makers of fully-reasoned decisions has been criticised for lack of realism. Instead, Cornish and Clarke (1987) describe individuals as acting within the limits of their ability, the information available, and time pressures. Cornish and Clarke refer to this as 'Bounded Rationality' (1986). This approach recognises that decisions are affected by the individual's perceptions as well as the circumstances in which they find themselves. Newer iterations of Rational Choice Theory (RCT) place the motivation of the individual as central to decision making, and state that an understanding of the offender's value hierarchy is necessary to understand their decision making.

This investigation seeks to explore the basic assumptions of this approach, that a decision is always at the heart of an offence, and that individuals weigh up their perceived costs and benefits in order to make such a decision.

Rational Choice theories of offending

Early theories of crime, viewed the individual as having free will, and as being capable of guiding his own destiny (Monachesi, 1955). These assumptions of free will and rationality have remained central to the field of criminology since its beginnings (Taylor et al., 1973), and are direct precursors of the modern Rational Choice Theory.

The application of RCT to criminology has been an influential approach, being particularly popular during the 1980s and 1990s when much work was undertaken to examine how rational decisions are made, and if this could be applied to criminal behaviour in individuals. Early iterations of the approach stated that potential offenders would avoid offending for fear of potential punishment (Akers, 1990). The assumption is that individuals act under free will, and in doing so will seek to avoid costs, and that the rewards of an action or behaviour will be weighed against those costs.

However, this approach has been criticised, in particular the assumption of the 'normative' status of the individuals making a decision. Cornish and Clarke (1987) suggest that individuals are unlikely to go through such a deliberate, calculating mental process and 'intuit' the values and costs of an action, being unable to process information to the level assumed by this normative model (Cherniak, 1986). Instead, offenders operate under a 'bounded rationality' in which offenders are seen as making a weighted decision, but in a more 'rudimentary and cursory way' than advocated by the classical economic approach to decision making. It is also recognised that while an individual can make a measured decision based on expected utility of various outcomes, their range of actions may be limited by circumstances.
The central tenet of an RCT of crime that offenders are active, rational beings encourages researchers to find out exactly what an individual’s subjective perceptions of costs and benefits are, and whether through applying this approach, crime can be explained sufficiently well. Furthermore, if a decision is fully understood then logic could theoretically be applied to change similar future decisions. When the theory is applied to real people, and real offenders, it is difficult to assume that decisions are made in this fully informed manner and that any individual could possibly process and be aware of every factor that may affect the outcome.

Studies of Rational Choice and the offending experience

Rational Choice Theory has been applied to various types of offence, ranging from shoplifting to violent offences. In 1992, Corbett and Simon applied RCT to driving offences, finding that offenders viewed the likelihood of receiving a penalty for poor driving as low. A study of shoplifters by Schlueter, O'Neal, Hickey and Seiler (1989) suggests that 'official' costs are not considered as a deterrent. Goals were identified as including money, convenience and the 'challenge'. Schlueter et al. thought it important that non-monetary goals were recognised as motivating the behaviour of the offenders. Carroll and Weaver (1986) also studied shoplifters, finding that they did think about risk, and were well aware of the penalties, but set this aside once focused on their actions.

There have been several studies carried out to investigate how RCT explains burglary, such as Wright and Decker's 1994 study suggesting that burglars were clear about the benefits, such as monetary gain, drugs, and social standing, but tried not to think about things going wrong. As well as robbery (Feeney, 1986), corporate crime (Paternoster & Simpson, 1993) and 'car-jacking' (aggravated car stealing) (Jacobs, Topalli & Wright, 2003), RCT has also been used to try and explain the commission of non-acquisitive offences, though to a lesser extent. For example, Beauregard and LeClerc (2007) applied RCT to the offending process of sex offenders. Results from interview suggested that the participants were rational, although bounded in their rationality, and that decisions were being made at each part of the process leading up to the offence. In a similar way, Topalli (2005) describes how violent offenders can use cues to ‘read’ a situation to their advantage and help them guide events.

Despite the close alignment between current crime management in the UK and the Rational Choice approach (Jones, 2008), the number of studies relating this theory to actual offender experiences is limited. Many studies on the RCT of crime use non-offending populations, and measure intention to offend, rather than examining actual offending, a drawback when applying findings to real world situations. This study therefore aims to investigate the self-report narratives of a range of offending individual’s histories to examine if there is any evidence of decision making, and what factors the individuals themselves sees as pertinent.

Methodology

Given that the aims of this research included obtaining the offender's perspective on whether a decision making process takes place, it was appropriate to adopt a qualitative methodology. In particular, the interview technique was utilised as the best way to collect
the type of data that would inform the research question. This interview was semi-structured in style, including areas the researcher wanted to cover, but with enough flexibility to allow the participant to talk tangentially, and to feel free to include whatever information he or she felt was pertinent. A similar approach was used by Zamble and Quinsey (1997) who used this technique to research the criminal recidivism process. Zamble and Quinsey employed a semi-structured interview, in which they asked their participants (recently released Canadian prisoners) about the events leading up to their most recent re-offence. They supplemented this interview with the use of two 'timelines' which prompted the participants to recall their thoughts, feelings, and time taken between the first 'thought' of an offence occurring, and the actions to the point at which commission of that offence took place. Bennett and Wright (1984) used a similar technique; applying semi-structured interviews to more than one hundred and twenty burglary 'specialists' in order to examine what affected their decision to offend.

The interview schedule was designed loosely upon the ideas used by Zamble and Quinsey which is to elicit information from the offender about his or her offending, and the thoughts, circumstances, and feelings that led to that action being taken. Unlike Zamble and Quinsey, who asked the offender to 'plot' six milestones from the first passing thought of the offence to the point of apparent inevitability, the approach taken within the current study was not so defined, and allowed the offender to determine their own timelines based on what they saw as influencing factors.

The interview schedule began by asking the participants to describe their most recent, or index, offence (the offence for which they were currently subject to probation). After outlining it, participants were prompted to describe what happened in the period preceding the offence. No timescale was specified, and instead the participant was allowed to describe as long or as short a period as they preferred. Moving forward, participants were asked to describe in detail how they felt, what they then thought, and what circumstances they were in at the stages during and following the period leading up to the offence. Participants were allowed to introduce whatever topics they felt were relevant to this narrative, and in effect, were encouraged to tell a 'life story' of their offence. Offenders were led through the events leading up to their offence with emphasis on their own thoughts and feelings, right through the commission of the offence. After describing these events fully, offenders were taken backwards through them again, being prompted to consider what elements had led them to be in their particular position. Participants were also asked to describe their views on what happened next, after the event.

In total, interviews were conducted with 46 participants, each of whom had been convicted of at least one offence. Participants were aged between 18 and 60, with a mean age of 33.9 years. Twelve were female, and the rest male. All were currently subject to some form of supervision, whether as part of a post custody licence or as part of a Community Supervision Order. Offence types ranged from shoplifting to murder.
How offenders make decisions: evidence of rationality

Findings
Though RCT has been applied to a range of different offences, its economic roots have led to the predominant research focus being into acquisitive crime. However, in order to be a useful applied theory of offender decision making, a theory must explain all offending decisions, those which are violent or emotive as well as the acquisitive. With this in mind, narratives were split into categories based on the nature of the index offence, creating a category of acquisitive crimes, and a category of violent or emotive offences. There was, in general, a difference in the phrases individuals used about their offences. Offenders in the acquisitive category appeared to make decisions about their offending, whereas the individuals in the violent/emotive category did not make such explicit decision statements. Statements such as 'I planned' and 'I thought' were common within the acquisitive category, but not present within the other category of offenders. Acquisitive offenders' narratives are marked by their desire to meet a need, and frequently stated that they made a decision, and thought about achieving their desired outcome.

'I always planned to get lists of what people wanted me to get for them, I knew I wouldn't be able to get rid of some stuff but there were always some things you knew you could always get rid of like CDs, DVDs. Things like that I would always take.'

Offenders, quite apart from ensuring they get what they need, seem quite good at making things go smoothly by managing others' perceptions. One enterprising female shoplifter became skilled in avoiding the attentions often focused on a known criminal.

'When I shoplifted I planned loads. I used to wear uniforms - nurses' uniforms, hairdressers' outfits. 'Cause I've got short hair I used to wear wigs - look completely different. I made foil bags, and go on the train - Chester, Warrington, St. Helens. It was like going to work - doing a day's work. I went there yesterday, so I'll leave there today. I wore that wig with that uniform last time, so I'll change.'

It does appear that there is evidence to suggest that some individuals make a decision about their offending to maximise their gain, or 'maximising their expected utility' (Carroll & Weaver, 1986). It is interesting to explore the idea of what the individual perceives as the gain, or utility of the offence. Equally, the negative consequences of an offence, as they appear to the offender, are important.

Thinking about consequences
Previous studies have shown great variety of costs or risks that influence decision making, far beyond the official sanctions or punishments. In order to be a useful theory of crime, RCT must recognise the wide range of costs and benefits that may affect an offending decision (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). The offenders' perception of costs and benefits are what matters, and the importance the offender places on them. This perception is limited by knowledge and circumstances and it is often argued that offenders do not fully understand the consequences of offending, often referred to as 'bounded rationality'
(Cornish & Clarke, 1986). The text suggests however that these individuals in fact do understand these consequences, but simply do not think about them.

'When you do it you don't think about the consequences, you just go ahead and do it. Not that you don't know them, Oh no, you know what can happen, you don't think about it at the time. You don't care - it's not important.'

As consequences are perceived to be more serious, the interviewees are nevertheless just as matter of fact. Another female shoplifter says:

'Because I shoplift every day, I know I'll get caught now and again. I'll only get a couple of weeks in jail. That usually does me good and settles me down a bit.'

It seems that offenders view the likelihood of capture or arrest as low, and reason that even if it does happen, that prison is something they know they can cope with. In fact, some individuals went as far as to say it was a positive outcome for them.

**Other costs of offending**

Of course, it is not only official outcomes that are a consideration. Many individuals worried about the impact on their family and relationships.

'I feel bad, not about the nicking stuff, but about lying to my family about where I got stuff. Once, my mum insisted on giving me the money for a pair of trainers for the (kids) I'd pinched, and I said "No, it's fine" but she insisted and I felt really bad.'

The negative effect on family is a common theme, and can be described in various ways. Another individual describes the long term negative effect his offending has had on his ability to live 'normally'. Sometimes, these non-official sanctions have only become a concern to the individual months or years after the offence. None of these realisations appeared to be a concern at the time of making a decision to offend; indeed they seem instead to be borne of a long spell of consideration. It may be that these emotional consequences are difficult to imagine when a person has not had direct experience of them previously.

**The benefits of offending**

Just as important as the offender's perception of the personal costs or risks of an offence is their view of the benefits or gains. These gains are subjective to that individual, and to their own feelings and views on their circumstances. As stated earlier, the offences within the acquisitive category were marked by the individual's intentions to meet a need, or get something they want. The simplest expression of what an individual wants out of an offence is described by one male shoplifter:
'(I needed) basic stuff, clothes, trainers and T shirts. I had nothing. I was at a pretty low point.'

From basic needs such as food and clothes, another common need was money. In addition to the general demands of life, money for drugs was also a common theme. A male shoplifter puts it simply:

'I needed drugs, so I needed money. It was a complete struggle.'

Aside from money, some interviewees also describe other positive effects of their actions. These range from social reasons, to personal gratification or positive emotion.

'I was terrified doing a burglary, but once you've done it, you get a buzz.'

The 'buzz' or excitement experienced through committing an offence was a recurring theme. So far, it certainly appears that the costs, benefits, risks and rewards outlined in the general definition of a rational offender can clearly be evidenced for these acquisitive offence types.

**Situational influences and constraints**

Although these individuals describe their goals and the planning of offences, their options of how to achieve their goals were limited. If an individual needs drugs, or money, they may have little choice in how to obtain these items, being limited by their own circumstances (Felson, 1986). Many offenders described how they would rather not offend, but felt they had no choice. This is touched on by the offenders who commit offences in order to obtain money for drugs which overcame all other considerations.

'If it wasn't for needing the drugs I probably wouldn't have done it, or if I did it, it would be a one off. Say for instance my son needed something I would go out and get it, but not daily.'

Whether to take drugs or not is not felt by addicted individuals to be a choice, but a given. Another interviewee, who was afraid of being arrested, nevertheless went on to commit an offence because she was more scared of what would happen to her if she refused. Her violent partner pressured her into shoplifting, and she was too intimidated to refuse.

'Yeah. I run through things in my head - getting caught and stuff - at first I was terrified I case I got caught, what would happen in court. It got to the stage though, (where I was more worried about) what he would do if I didn't go back with something.'

As these individuals describe, a decision to offend was made, but only as a last resort. It is clear that choices are being made, but only from the limited range of options that appear to be open at the time. Stated within the terminology of RCT then, their rationality is not only bounded by knowledge, skill and time, but also by the range of options actually viable.
as an outcome. This range of options will be determined by the needs and situation of the offender and therefore any decisions must be considered in this context.

**Other types of offending**

Looking at the narratives of violent/emotive offenders, there are fewer references to making a decision, or planning, but instead interviewees speak about acting under a compulsion, or against their better judgement. This group describe things that 'just happen' to them and to the individual these events may be perceived as being beyond their control.

When one man was describing how he committed a violent assault, he says:

'It was too quick. Nothing happens really, just blank and adrenaline, and go for it. It is me or them, so I go in first.'

This seems to be a common experience. Other offenders describe this experience variously as a 'blank mind' or as 'seeing red'. Consider this example:

'I saw red, and went for her.'

This offender was convicted of serious assault on his partner. The 'red' he describes in this case for him was a common theme in violent offence description. Offenders describing this sort of incident frequently referred to something 'snapping' or being out of their usual frame of mind. The experience of 'flipping' or lashing out is a common one, even if the victim was someone they cared about. While many of the offenders described above talk about an 'absence' or 'blankness' of thought, other participants described that some thought took place, but that their thinking was not 'usual'.

'I was not in my right mind.'

Despite the references to not being in control, or 'not being myself', it cannot be assumed that this group of offenders do not identify benefits of their actions, despite the unplanned nature of the offence. A male offender, convicted of a serious assault discusses the feelings around his offence.

'He made me feel so horrible, to make it go away, I nearly killed him.'

This individual saw his action as a release of unpleasant feelings. Several other individuals describe a feeling of release in committing a violent offence, which they see as stemming from a desire to 'get away' from negative feelings. Whereas 'gain' is a focus for acquisitive offenders, it appears that relief of feelings or pain is a perceived positive outcome for violent/emotive offenders. This could be described as a desire to become 'pain-neutral'.

The narratives of violent/emotive offenders may not fit within the RCT decision making model as well as those of acquisitive offenders, but despite the lack of an obvious 'offence participatory decision' there is evidence of other choices being made. Offenders describe
choices made which alter their circumstances, despite knowing that this may increase the risk of something happening, or making an offence more likely. This awareness of 'risky choices' may speak of the actions of a rational, if bounded, actor. One offender describes a set of small choices which resulted in him committing an assault on two men he found in bed with his partner.

'We (self and partner) were rowing, so I stayed at a friend's...I got a call from my ex, she said call round I want to see you...I went there, and got in the front and said to her kids "where's your Mum"? They said "upstairs" and I could see that they were frightened, I said "what's up?" they said "nothing". When I walked in they looked terrified.'

'Could I have done it different? ...She chose a night I would be drunk. I would have gone back down and said to the kids "come on with me" and taken them to my mates...but for her to have those kids there and for them to know what she is doing and they know I'm coming they were terrified; one shouted to me "don't get arrested" as I went upstairs.'

Within this situation, the offender has made a set of choices, each leading him closer to an offence. While not constituting a onetime 'participatory' decision, he was self-aware enough to know that what he was doing was a bad idea. Although an individual committing a violent offence may recall 'snapping', he may be able to describe how he moved into a set of circumstances that make the offence more likely. Whereas the acquisitive offender seems to make decisions based on whether they will gain, then the violent offenders' choices lead simply to a situation where the offence is more likely.

**Mixed thinking**

Despite these differences between offence types, there is evidence to suggest that both of these behaviours, impulsive and rational, exist within the same individual. It is important to consider that many offenders have a mixed history of offence types, and indeed many of the offenders in this sample have experience of both acquisitive and violent/emotive types of offences. For example, one offender specialising in well-planned armed robberies has a parallel record of violent assaults, committed while he was in custody. The same individual is capable of meticulous planning, and spontaneous violence in high security custody.

'Stake out the office where they keep cash for a few weeks to see when the money is taken. Go and loosen the hinges on the door. Then on the day go to the cashier office and kick the door in.'

'I (have) spent about 30-odd years in prison. Every time I am in, I am fighting so I was always in solitary confinement. Last time...I broke my jaw, busted my wrist and broke my eardrum. Two years on top (of my sentence) just because I pushed someone and they fell downstairs.'
Steele

The contradictions within this case are interesting, more so as the same offender says he prefers prison to Probation supervision. On further examination of his narrative, this individual clearly feels more comfortable in custody than living in the community, preferring a controlled and limited environment. This may also make sense of the violent assaults committed within the prison, as they are likely to earn him more time in custody - which he prefers.

In a similar vein, there are many other individuals who expressed a mixture of rational, planned offences and other, less apparently rational offences. One individual was accused of pushing a victim from a high sea wall, causing his victim serious spinal injuries. The offender describes his lack of recollection of doing this.

'It was a nice day; me and mates had gone to the...sea front. We got some beer in and seen a group...jumping off the sea wall and rolling in the sand...I remember going to the toilet and coming back and looking over and seeing a lot of people there, but I don't know whether I've done it or not you see so apparently I pushed him off the sea wall but instead of rolling he's landed on his feet, and jolted his back.'

The individual certainly does not describe any forward planning or rational intent to this offence. However, the offender later reveals that the victim of the assault was his previous landlord, who had recently evicted him, and admits harbouring negative feelings of revenge towards him.

Most of the individuals in the sample had a mixed offending record, having committed both acquisitive type and violent/emotive type crimes to varying extents. It therefore appears that rationality differs within individuals, as well as between offence types. In addition it is also possible to observe a variation in rationality even within the same offending incident. Examining one narrative, it certainly appears that to some extent, rationality (albeit imperfect) appears even within a violent offence.

An individual was prosecuted for a serious assault on his partner. He described leaving the pub one afternoon to look for his partner.

'I went outside and saw her necking some bloke. I saw red and went for her.'

With this action he has committed what appears an irrational action, but even as this was happening he recalls having a clear thought:

'I went for her, not him. He ran away fast and besides, he was bigger than me.'

These findings seem to suggest that far from evidence to support rationality being tied to the offence type, it appears that the same offence type can result from very different motivations, such as shoplifting for gain vs. shoplifting under pressure from a partner, or
assaults committed deliberately to extend a prison sentence vs. those carried out to release negative emotion.

**Discussion**

Any theory of offending must fit the experiences of offenders and place the offence within the personal and social context in which it is made. In seeking an holistic model of the 'offence event' it may be useful based on this evidence to view both actions taken in seeking both pleasure or benefit enhancement, as well as actions taken based on the motivation to be 'pain-neutral' are rational. Understood in this way, it is possible to apply to these findings what Hechter and Kanazawa (1992) refer to as 'thick' models of RCT, that is, a model within which the circumstances and perceptions of the individual are taken into account.

This 'seek gain/release pain' dichotomy can be understood as two separate goal regulation type processes, that is, the desire to attain a want or need versus the desire to relieve or avoid an undesirable state or situation. Human decision making is complex, so it is possible to conceive that an individual may engage in one or other of these processes at any point in time, and indeed, individual variations found within this study show this to be the case. It is also true that enough variation exists in the motivation of two different individuals to commit the same type of offence, that these motivations cannot be assumed from the offence type. Given that each individual will be operating under different circumstances with different motivations and different levels of stress, then the cognitive status, or decision making landscape of each individual will be unique.

These findings suggest that identifying the goal regulation processes the individual is involved in could assist in understanding the needs, concerns, feelings and circumstances of the offender’s thinking leading up to an offence. The analysis of the costs and benefits to an action will be heavily influenced by the goal regulation process that the individual is operating under, clearly shown by the differences between the extensive planning shown by shoplifters and burglars and the inward focus on negative emotions described by some violent offenders. The inward focus caused by strong emotion, could lead the individual to neglect consideration of long term consequences, instead concentrating on their immediate concern (Bouffard, Bry, Smith & Bry, 2008). This understanding of motivation is particularly important when considering an offender making a series of choices that appear to be putting him or herself under more pressure, a similar finding to that of Beauregard and LeClerc (2007) in their study on sex offenders described above. In many cases these choices are made as the path of least resistance, but result in the offender perceiving that they have no other choice but to 'lash out', behave violently, or become aggressive in order to achieve 'pain neutrality'.

If a decision making approach capable of encompassing these themes could be developed, it would have considerable benefit to the study of offending behaviour, and to those working with offending individuals. It would not only provide a heuristic tool for understanding how individuals make decisions to commit an offence, but could also provide an understanding of how an offender may feel an offence is the best or only choice of action. The primary element of this model would be to identify which offending
purpose was currently at play - whether the individual was aiming to achieve an outward goal (that is gaining something) or to minimise or avoid an inward state, that is, to maximise utility or minimise disruption. This understanding has the potential to contribute also to knowledge of how these decisions can become reversed and feed into established knowledge of the desistance process.
References


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PREDICTORS OF ENGAGEMENT WITH SUPPORT SERVICES IN A SAMPLE OF UK VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME
Michelle Lowe, V. J. Willan, Roxanne Khan, Matthew Brooks, Phaedra Robinson, Nicola Graham-Kevan, Rachel Stokes, May Irving, Marta Karwacka & Joanne Bryce, University of Central Lancashire

Abstract
Research suggests that engagement with support services after criminal victimisation is low. With this in mind, this study investigated predictors of engagement with Victim Support, in a sample of victims of violent crime. All violent crimes recorded by Lancashire Constabulary for two postcode areas (PR1 and PR2), who were referred to Victim Support (Preston) between April 2013 and September 2013 (n=869) were assessed, with a follow-up undertaken in 2014. Two percent of victims booked or attended a face-to-face meeting with Victim Support, and just over one fifth engaged over the telephone on at least one occasion across a range of support options at the initial data collection point. Engagement with Victim Support was not significantly related to future victimisation. When revictimisation since the first data collection period was inspected against demographic and crime-related variables, previous victimisation, regardless of the type of crime experienced, was the strongest predictor of being victimised again. This was despite the fact that such victims were more likely to be identified as high risk, and actively engaged with Victim Support at the initial time of victimisation. Suggestions for further research are made in light of the changes generally to victim services in the UK.

Keywords
Victim Support; survivor; violent crime; service delivery; engagement.
Introduction

One of the major developments in United Kingdom criminal justice in the last 40 years has been the shift toward the needs of victims as a primary focus (Burrows, 2014), with an escalation of services funded by central government (Spalek, 2005). Despite such commitments, current research suggests that confidence and engagement with the Criminal Justice System and victim support services generally, is less than satisfactory (Bradford, Jackson & Stanko, 2009). More work is needed to explore factors that disengage victims from reporting crime and receiving support after victimisation.

Victim support services have an important role in the care of crime victims. Victim Support is a large independent charity that has offered services to victims and witnesses of crime, and their families, in England and Wales over the last 40 years. Most victims of violent crime who report a victimisation experience to the police are referred to Victim Support as a formal form of support service (Victim Support, Personal Communication, 2013). Victim Support provide face-to-face and telephone help, including emotional support, advice on personal safety and other practical issues, support throughout the Criminal Justice process and advocacy. According to their website, in 2013, Victim Support was aided by approximately 1,400 staff and 4,300 volunteer workers. It currently operates a dedicated Homicide Service, which supports people bereaved through murder and manslaughter, and more than 100 projects throughout the UK tackling, for example, domestic violence, antisocial behaviour, racial, homophobic and disablement hate crime, and a national telephone support service that operates six days per week. The have also developed partnerships with other organisations, such as those concerned with health, children, women’s rights, racial equality, the police, and local authorities (Spalek, 2005). Bradford (2011) showed that Victim Support engagement increased levels of confidence and perceptions of the effectiveness of the Criminal Justice System by providing victims with a voice and a sense that someone is listening and taking their concerns seriously.

Support from victim services is beneficial to the victim’s recovery after crime (Mayhew & Reilly, 2008; Ringham & Salisbury, 2004). However, in many cases when support is offered to those who may profit from it, many victims do not engage (Mayhew & Reilly, 2008; McCart, Smith & Sawyer, 2010; Sims, Yost & Abbott, 2005). Indeed, in the study by Sims and colleagues, only three percent of the 654 crime victims in their sample used any type of formal support facilities. Sims et al. (2005) reported that those who did not use services listed reasons such as: receiving assistance from friends or family members and thus not feeling a further support facility was needed, not being told about services, or not thinking it was worth the trouble to seek out such services. They concluded that a victim’s decision not to seek assistance could be akin to the reason why so many crime victims never report their experience to the police in the first place, such as feeling ashamed, self-blame, or through fear that they would not be believed. These issues may be particularly relevant after being victimised by crimes that are known to elicit third-party victim-blaming reactions and negative attitudinal evaluations, such as sexual assault (e.g. Davies & Rogers, 2006), crimes involving gay and transgendered victims (e.g. Davies & Hudson, 2011; Laing & Davies, 2011), disabled victims (e.g. Rogers, Titterington & Davies, 2009), domestic violence (e.g. Harris & Cook, 1994) and crimes involving ethnic minorities (e.g. Locke & Richman, 1999). Negative reactions from others can create experiences of
secondary victimisation, which are as difficult to cope with as the effects of the victimisation experience itself (e.g. Walker, Archer & Davies, 2005). Engaging with victim support services, especially those that are seen as being aligned to criminal justice services, may be particular difficult if secondary victimisation is feared.

In extension, Zarafonitou (2011) proffered a political viewpoint about victim service disengagement, such that victims may believe that formal support services (such as Victim Support) are government-backed and as such, perceived negatively. This then drives those that feel they do need help after victimisation towards informal support systems, such as online support groups, which tend to be accessed more readily than formal ones (AuCoin & Beauchamp, 2004). Despite informal services being of use to some victims, formal support services like Victim Support, have advantages because they offer a variety of services within one organisation.

It has been acknowledged for many years that criminal victimisation is clustered, with some individuals and crimes committed within certain locations accounting for a disproportionate amount of victimisation (Outlaw, Ruback & Britt, 2002). For example, victims who live in high-density areas that are socially disorganised tend to have higher revictimisation rates; as do those with personal demographics like being male, being of a minority status, having witnessed violence in the past, and having risky routines and lifestyles (c.f. Cohen & Felson, 1979; see Outlaw et al., 2002 for a discussion). Moreover, we know that victimisation experiences early in life can make individuals vulnerable to revictimisation, sometimes of multiple types of crimes, later in life (e.g. Gold, Sinclair & Balge, 1999; Messman-Moore & Long, 2003), creating a cycle of victimisation experiences that is difficult to break.

The costs of revictimisation to the police, victim support services, and to society in general are many, with interventions being difficult, time-consuming and expensive to implement (Outlaw et al., 2002). Costs to the victim are also high. Being repeatedly victimised is a risk factor for complex trauma and increased vulnerability in the long term, which Winkel, Blaauw, Sheridan and Baldry (2003) found frequently not detected, and thus not supported, by victim support services. Such untreated complex trauma has many hidden costs to policing, medical and other services in the future. As early as 1992, Farrell indicated that victim support services tended to respond to crime as single, discrete events, rather than as one experience amongst others that the victim may have reported previously. Although knowledge about revictimisation has increased across services, still, in the UK there is a general pattern of assessing individual victimisation events as stand-alone entities. Investigating the causes of revictimisation to increasing service engagement, in hope of reducing revictimisation in future, is a key target among UK policing services. The current research is timely in this regard. Specifically, the current study investigated predictors of service use at Victim Support, in a sample of UK victims of violent crime within one location (Preston, Lancashire) measured over one six-month time period (April 2013-September 2013) with a 12 month follow up, to investigate further victimisation experiences and offences.

Victimological research has acknowledged that crime victim histories in general are not completely distinct from those of offenders, with some victims also having committing
criminal offences, and some offenders having been violently victimised (Schreck, Ousey, Fisher & Wilcox, 2012). Jennings, Piquero and Reingle (2011) reviewed 37 studies that spanned five decades (1958-2011) and found robust victim-offender overlaps in 31 of the studies. Findings were consistent regardless of historical and cross cultural samples, and regardless of the method of assessment or statistical techniques used to generate results. The victim-offender overlap was particularly apparent in domestic violence cases and in mental health populations. Recognising that victims and offenders are often the same individuals, with the same problems and risk factors, can assist service criminal justice providers who work with victims and offenders (Jennings, Higgins, Tewksbury, Gover, & Piquero, 2010). However, it is not yet known how the victim-offender overlap relates to the engagement with victim support service use after violent crime and whether engagement with victim support services (in this instance, Victim Support) can reduce both victimisation and offending in the future. This study investigates this possibility.

Preston, a city in the North West of England was chosen for this study for several reasons. It has a diverse population and relatively high level of social problems (Evans, 2012). In 2010, Preston was measured as the 59th most deprived area in the UK, out of a figure of 326 (Rogers, 2011). It has a higher rate of teenage pregnancy and unemployment than the North West region overall, and a higher violent crime rate than Lancashire generally. Between May 2013 and May 2014, 528 violent crimes were recorded in the city centre alone. This comprised 14.3 percent of all crimes in the area, the second-highest crime-group after anti-social behaviours (UK Crime Statistics, Lancashire Constabulary 2014). Preston’s relatively young and diverse population (Evans, 2012), coupled with the relative deprivation of the area and the consequent need to reduce violent crime and anti-social behaviour make it an ideal location to study crime prevention issues.

In this study, all violent crime cases recorded at Lancashire Constabulary and Victim Support were assessed within the allocated six-month time-period. Due to the potential high number of cases, only two postcodes were included; these were PR1, which covers the whole of Preston city centre and immediate surrounds, and PR2, which is a suburban area including a number of large housing estates. This study addressed two research questions: 1. the impact of engaging with Victim Support in terms of whether this reduces victimisation in the future; 2. the predictive ability of number of previous victimisations and offences, previous crime types, and demographic variables to predict those most likely to (a) fail to effectively engage with available services, and (b) be most vulnerable to future victimisation.

**Method**

**Sample characteristics**

Data was collected from the police database held at Lancashire Constabulary between April 2013 and September 2013 (n=1140 total adult violent crime cases). This was then merged with the service data held at Victim Support (n=869; 456 males and 413 females). Police data with no service follow-up or those referred directly to another service, such as a domestic violence service (overall n=271 cases) were excluded from further analyses, due to the large amount of missing data that their inclusion would create. Previous history of victimisation and offending referred to within this study related to events pre-April 1st
2013. Updated data inputting of victimisation and offending events was then conducted for all cases in October 2014. The updated victimisation and offending data referred to events between October 1st 2013 and September 30th 2014.

The mean age of victims at the initial data collection point was 32.4 years (range: 16-90 years). Over a third of victims were aged 16-24 (n=300; 35.3%) at the time of victimisation. The majority of victims were White (n=664; 76.4%), followed by Asian (n=153; 17.6%), Black (n=17; 2.0%), Mixed (n=16; 1.8%) and other ethnicities (n=19; 2.2%). Victims were mostly either British or EU nationals (n=762; 88.1%), with a further 4.2 percent (n=36) as EEA (i.e. European Economic Area) member; and 7.7 percent (n=67) of other non EU or EEA nationalities. In total, 198 different occupations were recorded. For cases where occupational status was known (n=638; 73.5%), the victim was employed or in education in two-thirds of cases (n=421; 48.5%), unemployed in 22.6 percent of cases (n=196) and retired in the remaining cases (n=21; 2.4%). For cases referred to Victim Support, 627 victimisations (72.2%) occurred within PR1 and the remaining 242 victimisations (27.8%) in PR2.

Procedure
The police and Victim Support databases were accessed to identify and collate victim demographics, vulnerability factors, crime characteristics (victim and offending history) and support types for all violent crimes recorded for victims aged 16 and over within the allocated timeframes as described above. A total of 87 variables were identified (43 from police; 44 from Victim Support). A coding manual was produced to ensure that all researchers involved in the project coded variables identically. Following the identification of variables, data were inputted and collated into a single statistical database (SPSS v.22). A final database of 869 cases was produced where sufficient data could be utilised for further analysis and the index victimisation had occurred in either of the two defined postcodes (PR1 or PR2).

Victim demographics and vulnerability factors
The following factors were selected for inclusion in the analysis: victim gender, age, ethnicity, immigration status, known practical and psychological vulnerability factors (such as being physically disabled in the case of the former, and learning difficulties or mental health issues in the latter), risk factors found at the crime scene (e.g. victim intoxication), and location of index incident (PR1 or PR2).

Crime characteristics
Crime-types were measured on 17 levels based on police categorisations. To produce a consistent and concise set of categories suitable for analysis, crime-types were recoded into seven categories for each database: 1) Threat and Physical Assault, Minor, and 2) Major; 3) Harassment and Hate Crimes, Minor, and 4) Major; 5) Sexual Assault, Under 16 and 6) Over 16; and 7) Robbery. Police and Victim Support classifications under this system significantly correlated: r=.86, n=869, p<.001. However, only one victim of sexual assault was recorded during the initial round of data collection (<1%), consequently the sexual offences categories were not included due to insufficient numbers. Thus, further analyses were conducted on 5 crime-types (percentages and number of victims are included in brackets): 1) Threat and Physical Assault, Minor (30.2%; n=262); 2) Threat and
Physical Assault, Major (46.7%; n=405); 3) Harassment and Hate Crime, Minor (16.2%; n=141); 4) Harassment and Hate Crime, Major (0.9%; n=8), and 5) Robbery (6.0%; n=52). Please note that in some analyses, empty cells meant that crime-types had to be collapsed further into just minor and major crimes.

There were three categories relating to the outcome of the victimisation case: 1) Restorative Justice; 2) Positive Outcome; and 3) Negative Outcome (e.g. Case cancelled, No crime, Prosecution not possible, Case closed). Victim-offender relationship was initially measured on six levels, reduced to four (plus unknown): Unknown, Stranger, Acquaintance, Ex-Partner, and Family/Partner.

Results
Initial contacting
Victims were contacted by Victim Support (Preston), using the following methods of communication: telephone (45.6%), letter (54.0%), and text message (0.5%). An inspection of descriptive statistics shows that 23.5% (n=204) responded to this initial attempt at contact for needs assessment, therefore the majority of victims (n=665, 76.5%) were not contactable at this early stage and consequently no further engagement was possible. Once successful contact was achieved, the following face-to-face services were offered: Emotional Support, Personal Safety, Practical Support, CJS Support, Advocacy, and Further Support. A large proportion of victims did not book (97.1%) or attend (97.6%) appointments to access these resources, and those that did only attended one appointment (2.0%). Only one case was recorded as ‘ongoing’, the remaining cases were classified as ‘Complete’ (n=868).

Whilst it is apparent that victims do not attend the face-to-face sessions, a sizable proportion of victims (n=183) received support via the telephone only, as opposed to attending the centre, which included: Emotional Support (n=29); Personal Safety Support (n=16); Practical Support (n=32); Criminal Justice (n=28); Advocacy Support (n=14); Further Support (n=16). When the sample of victims who received telephone support only were combined with face-to-face session attendees, an independent samples t-test showed that revictimisation rates since the initial data collection point were not significantly affected by whether the victim engaged with services (telephone and/or attendance) or not; t (867)=.63, p=.529.

Analysis
The first research question investigated the impact of service engagement and whether this reduced victimisation in the future. The total number of face-to-face sessions attended at Victim Support was not significantly related to total revictimisations since the initial data collection point (two-tailed Pearson’s r=.06, p=.082), therefore not related to a reduced risk of future victimisation.

The second research question addressed the predictive ability of crime demographics (i.e. number of previous victimisations and offences across crime types) and victim demographics to predict those most likely to (a) fail to effectively engage with available services, and (b) those most vulnerable to future victimisation.
In the following analysis, the total number of appointments attended was considered a suitable indication of engagement and subsequently used as a measure of Engagement with Services. The Engagement with Services scores ranged from 0 to 4 appointments (M=.03, SD=.27). A statistical technique called Standard Multiple Regression was utilised to investigate what victim and crime characteristics might most likely predict service engagement. Possible predictors comprised: Gender, Ethnicity, Type of Crime, the victim’s Intoxication Status (at time of crime), Risk Level, Psychological and Practical needs. The victims’ past offending history for minor and major crimes were also included. The full results are presented in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Standard Multiple Regression to Test Engagement with Services and the Predictive Value for Victim Demographics and Vulnerabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor Variable</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Pr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Demographics</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.736</td>
<td>-.01</td>
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<td>Ethnicity</td>
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<td>.057</td>
<td>-.06</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.23</td>
<td>.822</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Minor Offences</td>
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<td>-.51</td>
<td>.607</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Major Offences</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.782</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Vulnerabilities</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intoxication Status</td>
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<td>-12.09</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>-.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Level</td>
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<td>-2.46</td>
<td>.014*</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Needs</td>
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<td>13.58</td>
<td>.001**</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical Needs</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.06</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05 ** p<.01

Results of the Multiple Regression model were significant, indicating that the predictors included had some relevance to whether or not victims engaged with services, F (9, 858)=38.59, p<.001, R²=.29 (Adj R²=.28). In particular, the extent to which the victim was classified as having Psychological (β=1.15, p<.001), and marginally Practical Needs (β=.07, p=.063), reliably predicted an increased number of sessions attended at Victim Support. Likewise, other vulnerability factors included in the model were significant predictors of service engagement, i.e. Intoxication Status (β=-.99, p<.001) and Risk Level (β=-.08, p=.014), such that victims intoxicated on drugs or alcohol at the time of the index victimisation were subsequently less likely to engage with Victim Support than those not intoxicated. However, the majority of the sample were victims of threat and/or assault (Major and Minor; 46.7% and 30.2% respectively), whilst sober (n=665, 76.5%), and as such most victims were not considered ‘vulnerable’ at the time of the offence. Interestingly however, victims classified as low risk were likely to attend more sessions at Victim Support than those classified as high risk. Indeed, risk levels were deemed ‘Unknown’ for 84.4% of victims who did not engage. Thus, results relating to risk and vulnerability levels need to be interpreted with caution.

In addition to the Multiple Regression, how the degree of physical injury of the victim related to engagement with Victim Support was investigated using one-way ANOVA, with degree of injury used as a factor with three levels: no injury, minor injury and serious injury, (F [2, 866]=3.51, p=.030). It was found that those victims who sustained serious injuries as a result of their index victimisation subsequently attended more sessions (at
Victim Support M=0.12, SD=0.33) than those with minor (M=0.02, SD=0.24) and no injuries (M=0.03, SD=0.27).

b) A further standard Multiple Regression was conducted. In this analysis, possible predictor variables of the number of revictimisation experiences since the initial data collection point were investigated. Predictors comprised: Gender, Ethnicity, Relationship Association, Past Victimisation Rates, Past Offending Rates, Risk level, and Engagement with Services (total number of sessions attended).

The overall Multiple Regression model was significant, F (8, 797)=18.26 p<.001, R^2=0.16 (Adj. R^2=0.15). Three significant predictors emerged: 1. Past Victimisation Rates (β=0.36, p<.001; pr=0.36), 2. Engagement with Services (β=0.07, p=0.024; pr=0.08), and, 3. Risk Level (β=0.09, p=0.049; pr=0.07). Concluding from these results, it is particularly clear that previous victims were more likely to be revictimised in the future, even if they were recorded as high risk and were actively engaging with Victim Support at the time of the initial data recording.

Victim demographics, gender (β=-0.04, p=0.317) and ethnicity (β=0.01, p=0.821), did not significantly predict future revictimisation. Likewise, crime demographics such as type of crime (β=0.00, p=0.940) and relationship association between victim and offender (β=0.06, p=0.194) did not significantly predict future revictimisation. In addition, prior offending behaviour by the victim did not significantly predict future revictimisation (β=-0.02, p=0.640. The full Multiple Regression results are presented in Table 2 below.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Predictor Variable</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
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<td>.23</td>
<td>.821</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<td>Relationship</td>
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<td>.001**</td>
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<td>-.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk Level</td>
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<td>.049*</td>
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<td>ES</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>.024*</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05 ** p<.01

**Discussion**

The first research question addressed whether engaging with Victim Support would reduce future victimisation instances. Findings revealed that engagement was not significantly related to future victimisation. Secondly, when further victimisation since the first data collection period was inspected against demographic and crime-related variables, previous victimisation, regardless of the type of crime experienced, was the strongest predictor of being victimised again, despite the fact that they were more likely to be identified as higher risk by the police and even when victims were actively engaging with Victim Support at the time of victimisation. All other predictors were only minimally or non-significant. These findings are broadly consistent with previous research (e.g.
Predictors of engagement with support services in a sample of UK victims of violent crime

Grove, Farrell, Farrington & Johnson, 2012; Mayhew & Reilly, 2008; McCart et al., 2010; Sims et al., 2005; Steel, Blakeborough & Nicholas, 2011) and highlights important issues for victim support services and the police to consider. How these findings relate to the existing knowledge-base and their implications will be explored next.

One example of how the development of specialist victim services have failed to show reductions in repeated victimisation is the study of the successfulness of Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs) in England and Wales. MARACs were established in 2003 and are attended by relevant professional agencies (e.g. police and victim support agencies) to assess how best to manage ‘high risk’ victims of domestic violence. Despite approximately 270 MARACs in operation, reports suggest the evidence for their effectiveness at reducing revictimisation is untenable (see Steel et al., 2011 for further discussion). Moreover, in a systematic review of 31 studies on repeat victimisation, Grove et al. (2012) stated that preventing revictimisation was possible through appropriately-tailored situational crime prevention strategies. However, this did not include advice and education for crime victims alone: this method was not effective. Grove et al. noted an urgent need for further research into crime prevention for repeat victimisation across different crime-types with a focus upon the most victimised sub-groups, including what they called 'near repeats' (similar crimes, often committed nearby, soon after, against similar targets).

At the moment, in the UK, considering cases that might be considered near-repeats and cases that are deemed 'lower risk', is not a priority for specialist services. Taking domestic violence as the key example, a report by journalist, Nushra Mansuri, for the UK newspaper, The Guardian, in December 2014, highlighted the need for specialist service provision that is equipped to handle all victims that need it. In only providing specialist support via MARACs to those deemed to be in the top 10 percent of victims at risk of serious harm or domestic homicide, the vast majority of domestic violence victims are denied specialist help. It is unknown how many victims denied specialist services go on to be further victimised, continuing the cycle of revictimisation. Whilst it is accepted that services do not have limitless funds, it is clear that current practices are far from perfect and new ways need to be considered to better allocate resources to service all victims that do come forward. As the findings from the current study show that previous victimisation strongly predicts future victimisation, it is vital for services to consider interventions as early as possible in the victimisation-cycle, not just at the point from which a case is deemed high-risk.

Consistent with previous research (e.g. Mayhew & Reilly, 2008; McCart et al., 2010; Sims et al., 2005), the vast majority of victims in the current study did not engage face-to-face with any of the support services offered by Victim Support. Less than two percent booked or attended a face-to-face meeting. Just over one fifth of victims engaged over the telephone on at least one occasion to receive help across a range of support options. However, neither face-to-face contact nor telephone support influenced future victimisation events, with victims just as likely to be victimised again whether or not they were receiving support. It has been shown in past research that victim service programmes run in the United States offered no significant improvements on crime victims' psychological functioning when service users were compared with those that did
not use such services (Sims, Yost & Abbott, 2006). It could be similarly in the UK Victim Support services are not creating improvements in psychological functioning that might reduce the risk of future victimisation.

As previously stated, the systematic review by Grove et al. (2012) found that advice-giving or education about crime did not reduce the chance of a victim being revictimised. The example they gave was one of sexual victimisation prevention schemes that aimed to educate repeat victims with advice about how to avoid or manage risky situations that could lead to future revictimisation. They noted that a key problem with education is that it may change attitudes but not the ability to change behaviour. A similar effect may have occurred in the current sample, such that advice from Victim Support may have positive attitudinal benefits, or may benefit engaging victims in some practical ways - but these alone not sufficient to prevent further victimisation.

Additionally, current findings showed that most willing to engage with Victim Support on a face-to-face basis, were those victims already considered physically and psychologically vulnerable, and those with serious physical injuries as a result of their victimisation. This may be because these victims were more aware of their need for support, or indeed, genuinely more in need of it than other victims. Victims not seriously injured during their victimisation experience may feel that their plight is trivial and that follow-up support is not needed. Victims in previous studies have shown the same post-victimisation reactions with conviction that they can cope with recovering on their own (e.g. Jaycox, Marshall & Schnell, 2004), therefore this finding is not unusual or unexpected.

Somewhat worryingly however, victims who were intoxicated on alcohol and/or drugs at the time of the initial victimisation incident were particularly not likely to engage with Victim Support. This could signify that vulnerable victims who do need emotional and practical support are not being reached by a service that could help them. In order to increase the use of Victim Support by vulnerable crime victims, it is necessary to put greater emphasis on highlighting to the public about what services are offered, with services that can meet the needs of specific victim groups, and if necessary, broadening the types of services provided to victims (c.f. Sims et al., 2005). In relation to the broadening of services, it has been known for over a decade that services that offer support to victims of crime tend to ignore symptomology that occurs in the months after a victimisation experience (Winkel et al., 2003). As such, one additional service that Victim Support could offer is specifically for chronic stress after criminal victimisation and/or to develop closer links with services that can provide this service for victims who require it. Interestingly, those victims recorded as high risk by the police were less likely to seek Victim Support help than those recorded as low risk. High risk victims are likely to be already receiving support from a number of other specialised services, such as those provided by domestic violence organisations and hence do not need additional support, but the data available to the authors at the time of data collection did not provide this information so could not be assessed further.

The current study is not without its limitations. Reliance on the number of revictimisation experiences as one of the key criterion variables in the statistical analysis was limited in its scope because it gives no information on the psychological functioning of victims, or any
Predictors of engagement with support services in a sample of UK victims of violent crime

potential success of engagement. Psychological measures of sense of empowerment, or an increase in resiliency, may be more valuable indicators of success or recovery from an individual victim perspective than purely numeric measures. It was not possible to measure resiliency, empowerment, or other similar concepts in this study, because these variables were not recorded in the data. Using non-psychological, criminal justice data is always going to have limited scope for psychological investigation. That said, having a numeric measure of revictimisation and an investigation of its predictors, plus the data for subsequent victimisations as recorded in the follow-up data collection, is useful information for the police, service providers and future funders of victim services in Lancashire and beyond.

Within the UK at the current time, the future of victim services in general is being evaluated. The commissioning of referral services is transferring from the Ministry of Justice to localised Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in April 2015. In some areas of the UK this transition has already begun. PCCs are in the process of identifying the highest quality, most cost-effective services. Understanding the ongoing needs of victims - which are often complex and long-standing - will identify gaps in existing services and areas where improvements and cost efficiencies can be made. In Lancashire, North West England, where this particular study was conducted, the change to PCC control has been under-way since October 2014 (Lancashire Constabulary, Personal Communication, 2014).

What this means for victims of crime in actuality is a matter of debate. It is hoped that all changes made to victim services in the future will indeed be in the best interest of victims, to provide them with better and more suitable services, than simply cutting down on existing services to save money. One way that victim services might change in future is that there is more funding provided for smaller local victim organisations that currently exist on very small budgets that may have suffered cuts to services throughout the period of austerity since 2008. Such small organisations are not linked directly to the criminal justice process, but offer specific help or advice for particular types of victimisation experience (e.g. racial or anti-gay hate crime, support groups for victims with disabilities, etc.). Victims may prefer to access such services, and allowing local organisations to expand could be beneficial to them. That said, the development of local services at the expense of broad-ranging, nationwide services such as Victim Support could set up a future whereby a range of services available, but lacking consistency in their approach and success. It remains to be seen how well this re-structuring of victim services will work in the future, and it is certain that careful monitoring of this process is needed. Nevertheless, with carefully evaluated care, victim services in the future could see many improvements. It is already known that some victims of crime do not engage with services that could support their needs because of suspicion of formal systems (Zarafonitou, 2011). For these victims, smaller, local specialist services that meet their needs should be highlighted, perhaps on a case by case basis. Indeed, some services are more readily accessible than formal services that require appointments for face-to-face meetings, or lengthy telephone conversations (AuCoin & Beauchamp, 2004). There may be a wide range of reasons why victims are not able to engage with such systems, even if they are in need of emotional and/or practical support. Ease-of-access and cost-effective service provision now includes a wide range of online fora and even mobile phone applications, and it is a move toward
the use of modern technologies that might be successful in engaging more victims in future to receive support that they may badly need.
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Abstract
This article examines the release and aftercare of female prisoners in England during the late nineteenth century. Primarily it seeks to illuminate the use of residential provision for women who had been released from both convict and local prisons, contrasting the two systems and suggesting how such institutions may have affected the women’s subsequent offending. The research presented here draws on two sets of data, the material on local prisons uses a case study of female prisoners at Stafford prison (Turner, 2009, 2011) and the convict prison data draw on the licensing and release of female convicts collated for a recent ESRC funding project on the costs of imprisonment (Johnston & Godfrey, 2013a). This article outlines and reflects upon aftercare and residential provision for women leaving prison, during a period when a woman released from prison was regarded as ‘the most hopeless creature in the world’ (Reverend William Morrison, cited in Gladstone Committee Report, 1895). Aftercare and support were variable for those leaving local prisons, but for convict women released on conditional licence to a refuge, this could offer them the opportunity to build a new life after release.

Keywords
Aftercare; female ex-prisoners; refuges; re-offending; conditional licences; release.
This article examines the release and aftercare of female prisoners in England during the late nineteenth century. Primarily it seeks to illuminate the use of residential provision for women who had been released from both convict and local prisons, contrasting the two systems and suggesting how such institutions may have affected the women's subsequent offending. During this period there were two systems of imprisonment; local prisons held prisoners sentenced to periods of up to two years and the convict prison system held those sentenced to penal servitude for which the minimum term was between three and five years. Offenders were sent to either a local or a convict prison, based on the severity of their offence, less serious offenders to local prisons that were maintained by local authorities (until 1878 when they were centralised) and those who committed more serious offences, that warranted a long term prison sentence, known as penal servitude, to a convict prison. All of the convict prisons, for both women and men were built in London and the South of England, and those under such a sentence, were sent to this government run system, from all parts of the country. The research presented here draws on two sets of data, the material on local prisons uses a case study of female prisoners at Stafford prison (Turner, 2009, 2011) and the convict prison data draw on the licensing and release of female convicts collated for a recent ESRC funding project on the costs of imprisonment (Johnston & Godfrey, 2013a). Whilst there is a small body of research on the imprisonment of women in the late nineteenth century (Rafter, 1983; Dobash et al., 1986; Zedner, 1991), little has been written about any aftercare that they received on leaving prison or on the use of refuges for those on licence. This article outlines and reflects upon such provision, during a period when a woman released from prison was regarded as 'the most hopeless creature in the world' (Reverend William Morrison, cited in Gladstone Committee Report, 1895).

**Women and crime in the nineteenth century**

In the nineteenth century, women were a minority of those prosecuted by the courts; they made up about 20 to 25 per cent of those prosecuted and they were overrepresented in certain offence categories, these were; thefts and offences under the Pawnbroker’s Acts; drunk and disorderly; lower level assaults and public disorder; offences relating to prostitution. There were concerns about women committing offences like poisoning, baby farming and infanticide though they overwhelmingly committed less serious offences (Zedner, 1991; D’Cruze & Jackson, 2009; Godfrey et al., 2005). When it came to more serious or indictable offences women’s participation was similar, though it had declined from 27 per cent in 1857 to 19 per cent in 1890. However, in the latter decades of the century, women outnumbered men when it came to recidivism; there were more female 'hardened habitual offenders' with more than 10 previous convictions than male offenders (Zedner, 1991; Turner, 2011, 2012). The behaviour of 'deviant' or criminal women at this time was set against the Victorian constructions of femininity and womanhood; women were wives and mothers, they were to be pure, submissive and modest, caring for their families and children and managing the home. Women who broke the law were judged against these values as well as against the law; they were doubly-deviant (Zedner, 1991; Heidensohn, 1985). The role of carceral institutions was to return ‘deviant’, criminal or ‘fallen’ women to appropriate femininity and womanhood, through institutional support that was based on domesticity, religion, examples of virtue
and propriety as well as discipline and regulation (Dobash et al., 1986; Sim, 1990; Zedner, 1991; Johnston, 2015).

**Women in local prisons**

For those women sentenced to imprisonment by the courts, the most common experience was a short sentence in a local prison, usually just a few days or weeks for petty offences. In the 1870s, the average number of commitments for women to local prison was over 47,000 per year and only slightly less for the 1880s at just over 46,600. However, the daily average female local prison population was just over 4,000 per year in the 1870s and 3,400 for the 1880s, demonstrating the high turnover of the population on short sentences.¹ Those women held at Stafford prison were serving sentences that reflected these characteristics and women who were habitual petty offenders found themselves regularly going back and forth to the prison serving short sentences.² For example, Jane Peake was born in Stafford in 1854. Jane’s childhood and young adulthood were stable and unremarkable. However, by 1903, she was ‘A Disgrace to the Town’ and ‘A Well Known Character’ (Staffordshire Advertiser, 2 May 1903). Still young but unmarried, Jane and her aged mother fell onto hard times after the death of Jane’s father. But when Jane’s mother died, Jane found herself unable to cope.

Two months after her mother’s death, Jane was imprisoned for fourteen days for ‘sleeping out in a closet.’ This was to be the first of 33 convictions for vagrancy, begging and prostitution over the next eight years. Jane’s occupation was always recorded as ‘tramp’ or ‘prostitute’ and her address ‘no fixed abode’, although one of her brothers and a stepbrother both lived nearby with their families. From this time, until her last custodial sentence for vagrancy in 1904, Jane was repeatedly readmitted to prison within a week of discharge. By this time she was fifty years old and on this conviction, she was committed to Stafford County Asylum.³ She stayed there until her death five years later (see Turner, 2009). Whilst Jane’s case might be singular it was not usual for the period, there was deep concern about levels of recidivism in the late nineteenth century and the prison statistics seemed to suggest that this was particularly the case for female offenders. Although Jane did have a family living locally and was eligible for help at the workhouse (which the magistrates had repeatedly encouraged her to take up) the streets and Stafford prison had become her home. As she chose (albeit within very limited options) to remaining living on the streets of Stafford this only served to ensure that she would continue to be sent back

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¹ These figures are taken from the Judicial Statistics and show an average number of commitments of female prisoners for the 10 years beginning 1870 and then 1880 and the average daily female prison population for the 10 years beginning 1870 and then 1880.

² Stafford, the county town of Staffordshire was a medium sized and relatively prosperous town during the late nineteenth century. For a fuller account of female offending in Stafford between 1880 and 1905 see Turner, 2012.

³ From 1845 all counties were required to have a county lunatic asylum, whilst these institutions were supposed to accommodate those offenders with mental health problems it was often the case that magistrates could advise a committal to such an institution if they did not wish to send them to prison. In this case, after Jane’s refusal to enter the workhouse the Stafford magistrates committed her to the Asylum rather than sending her yet again to prison (Turner, 2009).
to prison. For offenders like Jane, there was no other means of support or subsistence beyond the workhouse or the prison.

Margaret Nash was also a regular inmate of Stafford prison. She had arrived in Stafford from Swansea as a mature, unmarried, childless woman sometime between 1892 and 1895 when she was in her early forties. She took up a position as a housekeeper to a retired, widowed tailor, Henry Aston, and they lived together at the same address until 1911 at least. Margaret was a persistent offender, with 23 convictions between 1895 and 1905, for a variety of offences such as assault, making threats, using obscene language, annoying foot passengers and fighting. For these convictions she went to prison fourteen times, either due to the sentence or because she refused to pay the fine imposed. The other nine times she was either bound over, received a caution or paid the fine. During her trials, Henry gave evidence in her defence, and she at his, and at times they were summonsed together.

These two women, although quite different, epitomise the experiences of women who went back and forth to local prisons on a regular basis (see Turner, 2011). Jane chose to go to prison rather than the workhouse when offered the choice by magistrates and Margaret sometimes chose to go to prison rather than pay her fine. For neither was there any government, local authority or charitable, financial, pastoral or welfare support on offer when released from prison; although it is unlikely that either would have taken it up, if offered. There were 176 recidivist women in Stafford like Jane and Margaret who were offending during the last two decades of the century. Of these, 66 were itinerant vagrants who had stopped in Stafford for a short time. However, 110 were women residents of the town for a significant time, even if they were not locally born. Of these 110 resident recidivist women in Stafford, 45 were persistent offenders. The other 65 women did not appear again in any court records and appear to have desisted, or at the very least they were not caught offending subsequently (Turner, 2009).

With historical research it is almost impossible to say with any confidence why someone may or may not have stopped offending. However, there were events that occurred in these women’s lives that may have impacted upon their continued offending. Current research suggests that relationships and family formation are significant factors in people’s desistance from crime (Sampson & Laub, 1993, 2001; Farrall & Calverley, 2006). However historical research has questioned this (Godfrey et al., 2010) and the research informing this paper also agrees that this did not seem to be an important factor in the lives of the recidivist women in this study. Most of the recidivist female offenders in Stafford already had a partner and children when they began to offend and therefore were starting to offend later in the life. But what other factors may have influenced whether or not these women desisted from crime or continued to offend? For some criminal justice interventions such as increasingly harsh custodial sentences seemed to have an impact but the majority stopped despite criminal justice interventions rather than because of them. Separating from an abusive or criminal partner, or moving away from a notorious neighbourhood or from a neighbour with whom you fell out regularly (someone like Margaret) or entering the workhouse if offending was linked to homelessness (which Jane refused to do), impacted on reoffending. This coupled with a general decline in prosecutions for drunkenness, which was one of the most significant reasons why women
became embroiled in the criminal justice system in this period, also impacted on appearances before the courts. Whilst no support on release or aftercare was offered to women leaving local prisons like Stafford, for those women that were sentenced to penal servitude and went to convict prisons, there were other factors that influenced re-offending rates.

**Women in convict prisons**

During the late nineteenth century a much smaller number of women were sentenced to penal servitude, and as such the daily average number of female convicts was 1209 in the 1870s, falling to 739 in the 1880s and declining still further to 205 in the 1890s. The sentence of penal servitude, established in the 1850s, after the end of transportation to Australia was a period of long term imprisonment served in one of the convict prisons located in London and the South of England. The sentence had three parts; a period of separate confinement, a period on the 'public works' and then release on licence. For the majority of the period under study here, Millbank prison held both male and female prisoners who were undergoing the stage of separate confinement, though they were held in different wings and kept apart at all times. Whilst under the public works stage, women and men were sent to different prisons based on their gender and in this case, women were held at Brixton and Parkhurst (in the early years of the system) then from the 1860s onwards they were held at Woking and Fulham prisons and later at Aylesbury prison. The final stage of penal servitude was release on licence. Licensing had existed in Australia to help convicts to reintegrate into society and this system was to be continued in Britain. Convicts were released either to be 'at large', or if they were female, they could be released on conditional licence, this meant confinement in a refuge until the Directors of Convict Prisons permitted their release.

Margaret Cavanagh is typical of the women sent to a convict prison (licence number A43342/7454). Margaret was born in 1860 in Preston to Irish-born parents. First convicted at the age of nineteen, she had two convictions for stealing from the person and two more for drunkenness. Then in October 1883 Margaret was sentenced to five years penal servitude and seven years police supervision by Lancaster Sessions for stealing a watch and twenty-eight shillings from the person of William Cook. By then Margaret was twenty-three years old, she was a prostitute and William Cook was her client. Margaret’s mother died during her time in prison but her father and brothers continued to live in Preston and she regularly corresponded with them during her sentence. After serving two years and seven months of her sentence, Margaret was released on licence in May 1886. 48 percent of her sentence had been remitted. Margaret did not go home, as may have been expected. She had been released, not to be ‘at large’ but on a conditional licence, the condition being that she entered a refuge; East End House. Nine months later, Margaret was given permission to leave the East End House. She did not return to Preston.

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4 These figures are derived from the Judicial Statistics for 1870-1899 and show an average figure for the 10 years of each decade with the exception of 1893 and 1894 where the figures in reports are missing.

5 All of the female convicts discussed here were found through the National Archives files PCOM 4 Registers of Female Convicts on Licence, 1853-1886, also available on www.ancestry.co.uk, also see Johnston & Godfrey (2013a).
but remained in the South and by 1891, she was living and working as a domestic servant in an industrial school in Watford and had not re-offended.

**Aftercare and support on release**

When a prisoner finished his or her sentence, the provision of aftercare varied across the country and provision for people leaving convict prisons was different from provision for those leaving local prisons. Either way, there was no formal aftercare provided for men or women released from any type of prison in the nineteenth century. Any aftercare was provided by charities, almost always faith-based, for example, Catholic institutions providing aftercare for Catholic offenders, or the Discharged Prisoners' Aid Societies (DPAS) which were also often faith based but provided generic aftercare for all offenders. During this period, police court missionaries also started to work with offenders though practice varied across the country until the beginning of the twentieth century (McWilliams, 1983).

The DPAS was an umbrella name for a national but disparate organisation and provided a range of services for people leaving prison, provided entirely with re-settling ex-prisoners in mind. Their chief aim was to find employment and temporary lodgings for a discharged prisoner, or, if he or she had what they considered to be a respectable home, to help with travel expenses to their home. Where there were no relatives and the person concerned consented, the aid societies could organise emigration for the discharged prisoner. Most of these aid societies had small amounts of government funding, although some refused all government funding to remain independent (such as the Gloucestershire society and the York Castle society). Many were active in providing voluntary, charitable aftercare for ex-prisoners well into the twentieth century until aftercare was provided on a statutory footing through the probation service as they took over charitable provision from 1907 onwards (Mair & Burke, 2012). Residential aftercare for ex-prisoners was provided on an extremely *ad hoc* basis and during the late nineteenth century was entirely provided by such faith-based charities. The 1914 Criminal Administration Act gave the courts powers to add a condition of residence to a probation order and paved the way for the establishment of hostels. Hostels (now 'approved premises') established under the 1914 Act were primarily for young offenders, although over the century they had been made use of by a more diverse set of offenders, including ex-prisoners released on licence (Wincup, 2007). Now residential care for offenders is almost entirely on a statutory level, but some charitable provision remains. In the late nineteenth century residential aftercare for ex-prisoners on licence was entirely provided by the DPAS or faith institutions and at the local level by the DPAS.

Wiener (1990:130) coined the term 'semi-penal' to describe those residential institutions that developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which straddled the boundaries between formal and informal control. Such institutions developed in order to accommodate the increasing number of 'exceptional cases' within the prison system, these included juveniles, drunkards, imbeciles, lunatics, vagrants and, of course, women. Consequently a plethora of non-custodial, semi-carceral institutions such as homes, refuges, and reformatories were established to cater for such groups. Recent work on semi-penal institutions for criminal and ‘deviant’ women during the nineteenth century,
such as refuges, inebriate reformatories, asylums and on inebriate institutions have all shown that these institutions shared many common disciplinary techniques with prisons and resulted in increased, rather than reduced, levels of control over women (Wiener, 1990; Barton, 2005, Morrison, 2008). However, the use of such refuges or homes for the aid of female ex-prisoners released from prison through conditional licensing or direct means during the late nineteenth century has not been researched or documented in any detail.

**Penal servitude: conditional licensing**

As noted above, the third part of the sentence of penal servitude was release on licence and for women this meant either a licence to be 'at large' as used with male offenders or a conditional licence through which they were sent to a refuge. Zedner (1991, 1995) notes their use in the 1860s discussing three refuges for women on conditional licence, but then does not discuss the proliferation of charitable provision that sprang up in the 1870s and 1880s. Both Wiener (1990) and Barton (2005) overlook this type of semi-penal institution, both discuss the Fulham Refuge in the context of 'post release' refuges however Fulham's role as a refuge was quite short lived and from 1869 it had reverted to a convict prison (Zedner, 1991). Women stayed in Fulham refuge until they were 'judged reformed' and based on the Victorian notion that 'women needed longer periods of detention than their male counterparts' (Barton, 2005:41). However, after Fulham Refuge reverted to operating as a convict prison the period of stay was determined by the length of their penal servitude sentence. For all convict women who were conditionally licensed, they served less of their sentence in a convict prison than their male counterparts, but on the other hand, they were subject to further institutionalisation for periods of up to nine months in a refuge, a condition that men were not subject to (Kimberley Commission, 1878-79; Johnston & Godfrey, 2013a).

Moreover, whilst the Victorians believed that female offenders required more than punishment, that they needed a process of moral rehabilitation before they were fully reformed (Wiener, 1990; Zedner, 1991; Barton, 2005), they also recognised that one of the difficulties facing female ex-prisoners was that, unlike their male counterparts who could often find employment in labouring trades, the main occupation for working class women was domestic service. Quite apart from the limitations on the ability of the prison to reform, attitudes towards criminal women were a major stumbling block for women seeking to start life anew; few middle class homes would consider employing a woman straight from prison. Refuges, which trained their inmates in domestic service and laundry work, provided a less intimidating image to prospective employers, to visiting 'ladies' and to the women themselves.

These beliefs led, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, to innumerable bodies establishing refuges and shelters catering almost exclusively for women under the umbrella organisation of the DPAS. Although the DPAS catered for men as well as women, it was predominantly for women that such refuges were established. These refuges catered for ex-prisoners from local as well as convict prisons. It was this proliferation of refuges that led to the government instituting state-run refuges - the Carlisle Memorial Refuge for Protestant women (in Winchester), The Westminster Memorial Refuge (in
Streatham), and the East End House Refuge for Catholic women (in Finchley) - which catered exclusively for women released from penal servitude sentences and a state-run scheme whereby those women 'whose conduct and character' justified 'the hope of complete amendment' (Du Cane, 1885, cited in Zedner 1991:214) were released on conditional licence – the condition being ‘that they entered a refuge.’ These refuges were run on voluntary contributions as well as profits from the labour undertaken by the women but they were also funded by the state who paid 10 shillings per week for the upkeep of the women sent there (Kimberley Commission, 1878-9). As was the case with Margaret Cavanagh who was sent to the East End House, many women were sent to refuges months before the end of their penal servitude sentence. The assumption that only women who wanted to be or were deemed 'reformable' were sent to the refuges, and not the 'hardened criminals', is also questionable. Many women who had been imprisoned for serious offences, recidivist women including those on repeated sentences of penal servitude, and mature, married ex-prisoners were granted conditional licences and were admitted to one of the refuges. That said, they were only permitted the opportunity to enter a refuge from a convict prison once and although women would request to be sent to refuges during subsequent sentences they were not permitted to do so.

Refuges for convict women on licence

One of the early institutions was the Elizabeth Fry Refuge for Women ex-Prisoners. Following a public subscription in 1846, shortly after the death of prison reformer Elizabeth Fry (1780-1845), the refuge opened in 1849 to provide temporary shelter for young women discharged from metropolitan gaols or police offices and 'to improve their characters' (National Archives, 2015). This institution therefore preceded the government backed conditional licensing system for women. After over sixty years at 195 Mare Street, it removed in 1913 to 18a Highbury Terrace, Islington and in 1923 was amalgamated with the Female Refuge for the Destitute, then based at the Manor House, Dalston Lane (Baker, 1995). The origins of this refuge were in the British Ladies Society for Promoting the Reformation of Female Prisoners a direct consequence of Elizabeth Fry's philanthropic work in Newgate in the early nineteenth century. Its committee met at the Elizabeth Fry Refuge from at least 1855. By the 1870s, use of this refuge was diminishing and although it did take some female ex-prisoners on conditional licences in the 1860s and 1870s, was referred to very little in the female licensing documents during the 1870s and not at all during the 1880s.

One of the most well used refuges was the Refuge of the Good Shepherd. This was a refuge specifically for Roman Catholic women and was known locally, and recorded on women's licence documents, as East End House Refuge. In 1864 the Sisters of the Good Shepherd bought East End House, Finchley, where until 1948 they maintained a refuge for distressed Roman Catholic women. New buildings on the site included a church in 1875 and a wing for the novitiate in 1886, when East End House became the provincial house for the order. Throughout the 1870s and 1880s it was used extensively for convict women and received women from each of the convict prisons. In the 1881 census thirty nuns, one

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6 It is now the Elizabeth Fry Probation Hostel, Home Office-approved residence.
Female prisoners, aftercare and release: residential provision & support in late 19th century England

‘lady boarder’, one male gardener, eighty-one females ‘inmate of the class of prisoners’, and one hundred and thirty-five female ‘inmate of the penitentiary’ are recorded as living there. By 1900 the order no longer received female ex-prisoners on conditional licence but instead turned their efforts to aiding ‘poor penitents’ and younger girls. Why and when the refuge stopped taking female ex-prisoners is not clear and the records of the institution are closed. The Sisters still live in the original building.

The Westminster Memorial Refuge originally opened in 1872 as the Westminster Memorial Refuge of the Royal Society for the Assistance of Discharged Prisoners for Protestants women and was based at 32 Charing Cross, Streatham. This refuge was referred to as the Russell House Refuge by prison administrators and recorded as such on the women’s licences. It was heavily used throughout the 1870s and 1880s and was also active in organising emigration to the United States for those requesting it. Women went to Russell House from Woking, Fulham Refuge, and Millbank prison. In July 1888, two years after Millbank closed, the Russell House refuge was taken over by the congregation of Roman Catholic Sisters founded by Frances Margaret Taylor (Poor Servants of the Mother of God). The purpose of the institution changed as it became a refuge for reformed prostitutes, rather than prisoners, and became known as St Mary Magdalen’s refuge. Other refuges in operation in and around the capital were the Carlisle Memorial Refuge for Protestant Female Convicts at 6 Queen’s Square, Middlesex (later in Winchester) and the Eagle House Refuge for Catholic women in Hammersmith. Both were in operation in the 1860s but seem to have been little used by the 1870s and 1880s.

Another less documented institution, but one that was recorded as a discharge address on some female licences was Mrs Meredith’s Home at Nine Elms House, 6 Upper Belmont Place, Wandsworth Road, also known as The Mission to Women. Although not a refuge that received women on conditional licence, and was entirely independent of government funding and reliant on voluntary contributions, Mrs Meredith’s Home was used by female prisoners leaving convict prisons and did seem to have a residential capacity. Four years into a seven year penal servitude sentence, Ellen Flynn ‘was seized with inflammation of the lungs of such severity her life was in danger’ (licence number A75019/7414). Ellen petitioned the Secretary of State for ‘remission of her ticket’ and, not having a next of kin, stated on the petition that ‘Mrs Meredith will receive her when liberated.’ This petition was not successful and neither were two more, but Ellen was finally released on licence to be at large fifteen months early to Mrs Meredith’s Mission - but only to receive assistance for her onward journey to her home town. It was clear, however, that Nine Elms House had the capacity to look after Ellen.

Mrs Meredith was very active in social and penal reform during the second half of the nineteenth century. Born Susannah Lloyd in 1823, she was the eldest daughter of a British Officer who was Governor of Cork Gaol (Lloyd, 1903). Marrying at the age of nineteen, she was widowed only eight years later. On moving to London her concerns led her to established the Prison-Gate Mission – Mrs Meredith’s Prison Mission - in about 1864, and then to set up the Marble Laundry for the employment of discharged women prisoners at 143 Clapham Road, the headquarters of the mission. Mrs Meredith became the Treasurer of the Female Prisoners' Aid Society. By 1895, Mrs Meredith’s Prison Mission was no small enterprise. After giving evidence to the Gladstone Committee, regarding her work with
discharged female prisoners, there were 70 paid workers, 301 volunteer 'lady workers', 3000 female ex-prisoners and their children being 'helped' annually (Gladstone Committee, 1895: Appendix 1).

Beyond institutions in London and the surrounding area, female convicts on licence were also sent to Winchester, to the Winchester Memorial Refuge, otherwise known as Battery House. This institution was used throughout the 1860s and 1870s (but little used by the 1880s) and reportedly had a progressive and liberal regime (McKean, 2006). Battery House was the brainchild of Sir Walter Crofton, one time Director of the Irish Convict System and later resident in Winchester. The building itself was acquired in 1865 specifically to accommodate up to 65 women who were serving the last six months of their sentence. Guilty of either serious offences or constant recidivists, they would be sent from Woking, Millbank and the Fulham Refuge and would encounter an unlocked premises supervised by Miss Eliza Pumphrey.

Miss Pumphrey and visiting middle class ladies provided an environment in which it was hoped the inmates would benefit from an elevated and caring environment. Employment was sought for the women and an informal form of aftercare operated. At the same time, the women themselves helped those who wished to emigrate by making shirts for sale in their evening leisure time. Crofton realised that many released women re-offended to repay those who had cared for their children while they were incarcerated. Similar to Mrs Meredith, he set up a small boarding school for the inmates' children in the Upper High Street. The women contributed financially to the running of this school and could apparently see the children as they played. Six out of 10 women released from Battery House were estimated 'to do well.' Officially only two women absconded during the fifteen years of its existence.

The Reports of the Directors of Convict Prisons 1874, shows just how prevalent the use of this charitable provision of residential aftercare was. Out of a total of 354 women released from a convict prison in 1873, 250 were sent to three of the refuges; Battery House, Russell House and most used, the East End House. A further 20 were helped by DPAS Mission to Women or DPAS London. As would be expected most of the female convicts were released for the public works prisons at Fulham and Woking (DCP, 1874:9).

The experiences and outcomes of aftercare
Women stayed in the refuges for roughly six months, although they could stay for up to a year. The stays lengthened as the convict system became more established. In the 1870s women were staying roughly between five and six months and towards the late 1880s, it was roughly between eight and nine months. Though as noted earlier this was time that formed part of the whole penal servitude sentence, that is, they were usually released earlier than they would have been normally, and the mark system continued to be applied to women’s conduct and work efforts whilst they were on conditional licence. The receiving institutions were guaranteed government financial aid on the proviso that an equal amount was raised by private subscription, beyond this there was no other government intervention or even right to inspect. The refuges, then, were not prisons per se but operated as a semi-carceral part of the penal estate.
These refuges probably operated along similar lines as other semi-penal institutions of the time, but differed in one significant way. Their operation did not completely depend on the co-operation of their inmates in quite the same way as other institutions. Although these institutions were technically 'voluntary', there was an extra element of threat. Women were under real pressure to behave or conform - or face an immediate return to custody. If a woman forfeited her licence by persistent misbehaviour or trying to escape from the refuge she was immediately returned to prison. However, women very rarely offended within these refuges, although occasionally it did happen. Seven years into a 10 year sentence for attempting to drown her son, Mary James was released on conditional licence to Russell House Refuge (licence number A75447/7422). After five months there Mary was found to be using ‘abusive and blasphemous language and shouting and screaming at the top of her voice in order to attract the attention of the outside public.’ For this outburst, Mary was immediately returned to Millbank, where she was punished with solitary confinement for eighteen days on a punishment diet. Mary was still released from prison early seven months later, but this time she was to go home rather than to a refuge.

Little is known about how women were selected for these conditional licences, although capacity at the refuges may have played a part. It may have been that in some instances these institutions were used to provide a place of residence, and hence an address, for women being released on licence if they could not provide an address, but there was no requirement then to provide an address on release on licence from prison. It seems that women were merely asked if they were interested in going by the chaplain or the governor or the lady visitors, although there is little to indicate who may or may not have been asked. Even the women who appeared to have been particularly violent or unsettled in prison were able to go to refuges. So women were not being chosen or selected on behaviour, despite the intention that conditional licences were to be offered only to those women who justified ‘the hope of complete amendment.’ Women may have chosen to go to a refuge on a conditional licence simply because it was preferable to staying an extra six months or so in a convict prison. Conditions would without doubt have been much better in the refuges than the convict prisons. It is most likely that the decision was an automatic and bureaucratic one; when a woman reached a certain point in her sentence, if she had not been to a refuge on a previous penal servitude sentence, she was offered a refuge place. It was not based on offence history, age, family situation or behaviour. Older women like Elizabeth Carroll went to the East End refuge in 1887 for nine months when she was 54 years old, she had a husband and 8 children (licence number A42656/7411). Some women found stability at such refuges and they never left. Catherine Brown was released on conditional licence to the Refuge of the Good Shepherd (East End House) during her fourth sentence of penal servitude (licence number 77919/7494). She was aged forty-four and had spent 27 years of her life in prison. Catherine stayed with the Sisters until her death 25 years later.

For the government, these charitable organisations provided board and lodging for women for a period of time that the prison estate would normally be housing the women. Although there was a small amount state funding for the refuges, it is likely that the refuges would have been a more cost effective system than the penal estate. There would probably have also been a more altruistic reason. Men may have been able to find casual
work more easily but women were likely to want to enter domestic service where a good ‘character’ (or reference) was vital for gaining a position. Employers reluctant to take servants from a prison might, it was hoped, be persuaded to take them from a refuge. Practically the refuges sought to provide the women with the skills that, they assumed, women might need on release, such as cleaning, laundry and cooking. How these institutions came to be established and how they operated cannot be deciphered in more detail without more much archival research. Neither can it be determined how, when and why they ceased to be, though it is likely that the declining female convict population and the developments of probation in the following decades contributed to this.

Returning to the local setting, Stafford was unusual in that it did have its own aid society refuge explicitly set up to cater for women released from the local prison, though the women being released were not on licence. The North and South Staffordshire DPAS proposed a refuge when they found that they had no means of disposal for discharged female prisoners within Staffordshire except sending them to institutions outside the county. The Staffordshire County Industrial Home for Discharged Female Ex-Prisoners and Friendless Women was erected in 1878, close to Stafford prison. This refuge was different to those previously mentioned, in that the stay was to be two years, with a placement as a domestic servant afterwards. Although the original aim of the refuge was to assist women discharged from Stafford Prison, very few took up the offer of a place there, probably because of the length of commitment, and the lack of occupancy by women from Stafford necessitated that the available places were offered further afield. In 1883, out of 23 admissions, fourteen were discharged prisoners. In 1884, out of 25 admissions only eight were discharged prisoners. Despite this though, none of the recidivist women living and offending in Stafford, like Jane and Margaret, were ever admitted there.

**Conclusion**

Women released from local prisons just walked out of the front door and back home, or to the nearest public house. Women were often re-arrested, found themselves back in court and back in prison within a day or two of release. Many women went home, back to their families, although depending on the circumstances, that could have been a good or a bad thing. Those that had no family (or family prepared to offer them a home) could find themselves in a persistent cycle of poverty and incarceration. These women spent much of their lives shunted from one institution to another, their lives revolving around the workhouse and the prison with periods of homelessness in between. It was this ability to return to families and communities that ultimately exacerbated or at least continued some women’s involvement in crime. Returning to the circumstances in which they offended in the first place did little to help them reform. Those that did reform were successful not because of the criminal justice system but often in spite of it. Any aftercare offered by charitable organisations to those released from local prisons was haphazard and subject to the interest of the local governing elite of that local area, as where such provision existed, they were often the subscribers. Before the centralisation of local prisons in 1878, conditions and provision in local prisons varied significantly across the country, though after the government gained control of the system, the first Director, Edmund Du Cane, did encourage the establishment of DPAS across the system.
The story for women released from convict prisons was different. Whilst aftercare support from charitable organisations may have been influenced by the location of the convict prisons in London and the South of England, or by the fact that they were government rather than locally controlled, attendance in a refuge was atypical. Custody in a refuge on conditional licence for the last six to nine months of their sentence of penal servitude offered an innovative approach specifically addressed to the problems of convict women. At the same time the refuges were typical of much Victorian philanthropy. They offered moral and religious guidance and support, underpinned by typically feminine labour and domestic chores, to women who were serving a sentence of penal servitude, but they only offered this opportunity once. Similar to other institutions for wayward women and girls, they were not interested in those women who had ‘fallen too far’, or who were thought ‘irreclaimable.’ The aid societies did at least provide women leaving prison, in a city for many, far from home and without adequate means, a way of getting home. The refuges, despite their carceral role, offered living conditions better than the prison, and the chance to find employment and therefore a home, albeit as a domestic servant. Such an opportunity also provided women with the advantage of anonymity and the chance to change name, move house, sever ties, and to be employed with few questions asked. The refuges had a positive role in resettling women and the aftercare women received on leaving convict prisons did contribute to reducing their re-offending.
References


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AN EXPLORATION OF THIRD PARTY DISCLOSURE AND OUTCOMES IN REGISTERED SEX OFFENDERS
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Abstract
Disclosure - sharing specific information about an offender with a third party - is an important tool in the range of risk management options available to agencies when managing convicted sex offenders placed on the Sex Offender Register in England and Wales. However, disclosure has not been widely researched, and assumptions that it is effective in reducing the likelihood of further sexual offending cannot be empirically supported as yet. This study aimed to gather descriptive data on the frequency and nature of third party disclosures on Registered Sex Offenders in five London boroughs, with reference to the method of disclosure, the outcome, and subsequent offence failures. One hundred and twenty nine third party disclosures were made over the one year period, most commonly to those in close relationships with the offender. Outcomes were variable in terms of acceptance and rejection, although the method by which disclosure was made had a significant impact on the outcomes. The rate of offender non-compliance with statutory regulations over the research period was relatively high suggesting that this was a group of less compliant offenders. Implications for future research and good practice are discussed.

Keywords
Disclosure, sex offender, community, outcome
Introduction

Disclosure is considered to be an important and necessary resource for the effective risk management of sexual offenders. Disclosure, in this context, refers to ‘the sharing of specific information about a MAPPA offender with a third party (not involved in MAPPA) for the purpose of protecting the public’ (MAPPA Guidance, 2012). This should not be confused with information-sharing between agencies.

MAPPA refers to the multi-agency public protection arrangements which were introduced in England and Wales in 2001 under Sections 67 and 68 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act (2000) to facilitate the sharing of information among agencies to improve public protection. MAPPA is now covered by the Criminal Justice Act (2003, section 325-327). Police, probation and prison services form the Responsible Authority with a statutory duty to ensure that the risks posed by specified sexual and violent offenders are assessed and managed appropriately, and other agencies - such as health, youth justice and the local authority - have a ‘duty to co-operate’ (Criminal Justice Act, 2003, section 325(3)).

One of the categories of offenders falling within the remit of MAPPA is Registered Sex Offenders (RSOs). These are convicted sex offenders who are subject to notification requirements under the Sexual Offences Act, 2003. Under the terms of the Act, RSOs must notify police of their name, address, all foreign travel, bank and credit card details, as well as information about their passports and other identity documents. RSOs - as with other MAPPA offenders - can be managed at three levels. Level 1 refers to ordinary agency management where the risks posed by the offender can be managed by the agency responsible for the supervision or case management. This involves information sharing but does not require multi-agency meetings. Level 2 is for those offenders whose risk requires active multi-agency management and for whom risk management plans are agreed via a multi-agency meeting. Level 3 is reserved for cases which meet the level 2 criteria but where the management issues require senior representation from the agencies, and there may be a need to commit significant resources at short notice.

The most recent MAPPA guidance (Section 10.2, 2012) sets out principles underpinning the use of disclosure. Disclosure should be lawful, proportionate, accurate and necessary. Proportionate refers to a number of considerations within the guidance, including the potential risk to the offender as a result of disclosure and the consideration and recording of alternatives to disclosure; the provision of information regarding key triggers for offending behaviour or other advice regarding management, not necessarily an offence history; and procedures to support both victims and offenders in case there is a breakdown in the process. Finally, the guidance suggests that ‘it is preferable that the offender knows that disclosure is taking place. On occasion, the offender may make the disclosure himself or herself in the presence of the police or the Offender Manager (probation officer), or may later confirm or verify the content of the disclosure’ (p.56).

Although there have been process evaluations of the MAPPA process (for example, Wood and Kemshall, 2007), there are only two published research studies on the use of third party disclosure under MAPPA. Cann (2007) reported on a survey of the 43 police areas in...
England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Only 29 of the 40 areas which responded had made disclosures in the preceding six months. The survey revealed that the primary reason for disclosure was child protection, usually precipitated by a change in an offender’s personal relationships, housing or employment situation. Most commonly it was the details of the convicted offence which were disclosed. Both negative and positive consequences were highlighted: potential destabilisation of the offender versus enhanced public protection by limiting opportunities for offenders to access risky situations.

Penny and Craissati (2012) surveyed regular participants in MAPPA level 2 meetings across London with a response rate of 196 questionnaires. Respondents expressed confidence in their knowledge of disclosure law and procedures, but widely divergent views in their response to a range of hypothetical disclosure scenarios. The authors raise implications of the research for practice including improved understanding and guidance around third party disclosure, additional training and governance oversight.

In 2007, the Review of the Protection of Children from Sex Offenders was published, which led to the Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme. This scheme was rolled out across England and Wales in three stages and was implemented across the country in 2011. The scheme is primarily the responsibility of the police, who manage a clear access route for the public to register their child protection interest in a named individual and - should there be relevant convictions and a risk posed - to receive a disclosure of pertinent information regarding the individual. A pilot over 36 weeks resulted in 53 enquiries, with 25 child concern reports being raised as a result (Chan, Homes, Murray and Treanor, 2010). Eleven of these reports involved disclosure to a parent regarding the offender’s conviction. The authors note that there was no indication that the scheme had had a negative impact on the behaviour of RSOs in the area, although this was not formally investigated. A related study with similar findings was conducted in four police areas in England and Wales (Kemshall and Wood, 2010). Interestingly, Kemshall, Kelly and Wilkinson’s (2012) reviewed the views of applicants within the Child Sex offender Public Disclosure Scheme. They found that in the few cases where a disclosure was made, the applicants who were not in a professional role remained anxious, and uncertain as to how to make use of the information.

The evidence from the United States, where community notification has been in place from the late 1990s onwards, is equivocal. Sex offender details have been publically available for a number of years; a summary of the evidence (Fitch, 2006) would suggest that there is no empirical evidence that community notification has had a positive impact on sex offender recidivism rates, nor has it resulted in fewer assaults by strangers on children.

There have been some attempts to consider disclosure from the offender perspective. Both Connor (2007) and Hudson (2005) had similar findings. Connor’s qualitative study found that sex offenders were deeply avoidant of situations potentially requiring disclosure, for fear of rejection and retaliation; the offenders had already constructed personal narratives around their offending which avoided stigma - minimising or lying - which disclosure threatened, not least because of a fear of losing control over the disclosure process, and it being used against them.
Traditional approaches to risk management have focused on identifying risk factors for targeted intervention, a strategy identified by Kemshall and Wood (2008) as a “protection strategy” which aims to protect communities through control of risk. This approach is often dominated by the offender adopting avoidance strategies which can lead to impoverished lives and hopelessness, as suggested by the participants in Connor’s (2007) study. There is a growing research literature which suggests that the progression from persistent offending to desistence is the outcome of a complex interaction between subjective and social factors (Farmer, McAlinden and Maruna, 2015); that is, structure (informal social controls such as relationships with intimate partners and employment) and agency (the way in which offenders think about themselves and their lives). For persistent offenders in particular, this entails finding a more positive identity as a non-offender which includes meaningful engagement in the community, which has a more powerful impact on desistance than traditional risk management methods (Maruna and Farrell, 2004; Farmer, McAlinden and Maruna, 2015). The desistance literature also highlights the importance of building and sustaining hope in the journey from offending to a new non-offending identity, which includes others believing in the offender’s current personal identity rather than his ‘old me’. There has been little published research into desistance from sexual crime. Krutttschnitt, Uggen and Shelton (2000) conducted a retrospective study of 556 sexual offenders to examine whether informal social controls - specifically employment and marriage - predicted desistance from offending, and found that job stability significantly reduced the probability of re-offending but marital status did not. Harris (2014) in a qualitative study of 21 desisting sexual offenders found that the majority of them attributed their desistance to changes in thinking. The most recent qualitative study of apparently desisting sexual offenders (Farmer, McAlinden and Maruna, 2015) found that the offenders themselves attributed their desistance to cognitive factors, weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of repeating their crimes. The authors tentatively suggest that the desisting narratives in their study tended to support a move away from backward looking approaches towards future-focused therapeutic interventions with an emphasis on optimism and hope.

As yet, there is no published evidence available to confirm whether disclosure does indeed protect the public by managing (or perhaps avoiding) risky situations, or whether it inadvertently reduces opportunities for accessing socially valued roles (such as a parent, or skilled worker) which in turn impedes processes of recovery or desistance.

The aim of the study was to build on the limited evidence base in relation to disclosure under MAPPA arrangements, by focusing on RSOs and providing details of the frequency of disclosures and how they are made, the life domains in which they are made, and the outcomes in terms of inclusion or exclusion. There were no specific hypotheses, although it was expected that:

- disclosures would probably be made most commonly in higher risk sex offenders;
- there would probably be fairly high levels of rejection as a result of the disclosure.
Methodology

Participants
The sample included all those individuals convicted of a sexual offence, held on the Sex Offender Register in five boroughs of south east London, and who were subject to a third party disclosure at any time within the preceding 12 months (December 2013 to November 2014). The five boroughs were primarily chosen for their geographical proximity to each other (for each of data collection) and were considered to a reasonable spread of types of London borough; the lead author was known to the police teams in the area which greatly facilitated cooperation with the project.

Data was collected on the type of offence (child victims, adult victims, or non-contact sex offending), the start date of the Sex Offender Registration, the risk level (as measured by the Risk Matrix 2000, Thornton et al., 2003), and whether the offender was subject to a Sex Offences Prevention Order (SOPO). Additional data was collected in a semi-structured interview with the Jigsaw teams (the police teams responsible for participation in MAPPA and maintenance of the SOR), including details on the disclosures, how they were made (by the police first by telephone or visit, or offender first, and then followed up by the police), and the outcomes.

Disclosure domains were divided into the following domains: employment (current or potential), training establishments (such as colleges), relationships (family and friends), social (such as clubs, the church, or housing associations).

Outcomes were defined, in relation to the response of the person/organisation disclosed to, as follows: accepted, partially accepted (subject to conditions such as restricted access or supervised contact), rejected, and withdrawal (of the offender prior to the disclosure in anticipation of a disclosure being made).

Offence failures were defined as any re-arrest for a general, violent or sexual offence, or a recall to prison, between the time the disclosure was made and the data collection point. Therefore, the time at risk for a failure was up to a maximum of one year.

Procedure
Anonymised and non-identifiable data was provided by the Metropolitan Police Public Protection Unit, from the ViSOR electronic record system, where the specific indicator ‘disclosure’ was endorsed on the offender record. The ViSOR and PNC (police national computer) numbers enabled the Jigsaw teams to identify the offenders, and discuss disclosure information without identifying individual offenders. The Metropolitan Police lead for Public Protection contacted the head of each of the five Jigsaw teams, advising them of the nature of the research, and the support of the London MAPPA Strategic Management Board (SMB). Individual meetings were then set up with each of the five

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7 ViSOR is a UK-wide system used to store and share information and intelligence on those individuals who have been identified as posing a risk of serious harm to the public; it is designed to facilitate the work of MAPPA by assisting co-operative working between the three ‘Responsible Authorities’ (police, probation and prison services).
team leaders, in order to work through the semi-structured interviews, and complete any missing information.

The researchers were given local ethical approval by the National Probation Service (NPS) London Division to access the London probation electronic record system; additionally they were provided with a list of the Registered Sex Offenders held on post-custodial licence or community orders by the probation service in the five boroughs, and who had been in the community for the past 12 months (December 2013 to November 2014). This data was cross referenced and checked with the police data (above), and any additional offenders who had been subject to a probation third party disclosure were added to the sample.

**Measures**

The Risk Matrix 2000 (Thornton et al., 2003) is routinely completed by Jigsaw teams and/or probation officers from file information on all convicted sex offenders across London. It is an actuarial measure predicting sexual reconviction in sex offenders. It comprises a simple baseline risk classification based on conviction data, adjusted at stage two if two or more aggravating factors are found (for example, male or stranger victims). Two cross-validation studies tested the predictive validity of the scale in a short-term follow up sample of treated sex offenders and a long-term follow up sample of untreated sex offenders. The ROC Area under the Curve was 0.77 and 0.75 for the two samples. ROC provides a measure of predictive accuracy, with 0.50 representing no better than chance, and higher scores reflecting increasing accuracy. The two and sixteen year follow up recidivism rates were 0.9% and 8% low risk, 1.3% and 18.3% medium risk, 5.7% and 40.5% high risk, and 17.2% and 60% very high risk, respectively.

**Ethical approval**

Support for the project was provided by the Strategic MAPPA Board for London, and ethical approval obtained from the Metropolitan Police and from the Deputy Director of the National Probation Service for London. The consideration of safe and anonymised transfer and storage of sensitive information was an important consideration.

**Results**

The ViSOR records did not identify all the disclosure cases, and some cases recorded as disclosures in fact pertained to information exchange with other agencies. However, Jigsaw teams clearly knew their caseload of offenders on the SOR, and were able to identify all suitable cases with ease. Cross referencing with the probation service records confirmed the police disclosure in 10 cases, and identified a further 19 cases where the probation officer had made a disclosure, not already recorded in police records. An examination of these cases confirmed that there were no significant differences, and they were incorporated into the main analysis.

In December 2014, there were a total of 1,576 offenders on the Sex Offender Register (SOR) in the five boroughs in the study. There were 129 third party disclosures made for this group of offenders across the year of study, suggesting an approximate 8% disclosure rate within the year. All the participants in the study were male (there were no disclosures in relation to female offenders). Of the offenders on the SOR, 51 (3%) were being
managed at MAPPA level 2 at the time of disclosure, and all the rest were managed at level 1, save two managed at level 3. The start of the SOR was unknown in 15 cases, but for the remaining 114 offenders, the average time on the SOR was 4 years 8 months (sd 4 years 2 months, range 1 month to 21 years 10 months). The results are set out in more detail in Table 1.

Table 1: Offence related details in relation to Borough

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Borough</th>
<th>A (%)</th>
<th>B (%)</th>
<th>C (%)</th>
<th>D (%)</th>
<th>E (%)</th>
<th>TOTAL (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total on Sex Offender Register 8</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>1576</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disclosures (% of SOR)</td>
<td>12 (6%)</td>
<td>52 (24%)</td>
<td>20 (7%)</td>
<td>29 (7%)</td>
<td>16 (3%)</td>
<td>129 (8%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Managed @ MAPPA level 2 (% of SOR)</td>
<td>5 (3%)</td>
<td>7 (3%)</td>
<td>23 (8%)</td>
<td>8 (2%)</td>
<td>8 (2%)</td>
<td>51 (3%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Offence Type (n=129)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Child victim</td>
<td>4 (33%)</td>
<td>25 (48%)</td>
<td>13 (65%)</td>
<td>13 (45%)</td>
<td>8 (50%)</td>
<td>63 (49%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adult victim</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
<td>10 (19%)</td>
<td>3 (15%)</td>
<td>8 (28%)</td>
<td>5 (31%)</td>
<td>29 (23%)</td>
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<td>Non-contact</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
<td>17 (33%)</td>
<td>4 (20%)</td>
<td>8 (19%)</td>
<td>3 (19%)</td>
<td>37 (29%)</td>
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<td>Risk Matrix (n=126)*</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
<td>4 (8%)</td>
<td>4 (20%)</td>
<td>3 (10%)</td>
<td>5 (33%)</td>
<td>21 (17%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
<td>19 (38%)</td>
<td>9 (45%)</td>
<td>8 (28%)</td>
<td>6 (40%)</td>
<td>45 (36%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
<td>14 (28%)</td>
<td>6 (30%)</td>
<td>7 (24%)</td>
<td>4 (27%)</td>
<td>34 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>13 (26%)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>11 (38%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAPPA** (n=129)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
<td>41 (79%)</td>
<td>12 (60%)</td>
<td>27 (93%)</td>
<td>15 (94%)</td>
<td>98 (76%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>9 (75%)</td>
<td>11 (21%)</td>
<td>8 (40%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>31 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOPO (n=129)</td>
<td>8 (67%)</td>
<td>14 (27%)</td>
<td>6 (30%)</td>
<td>13 (45%)</td>
<td>6 (38%)</td>
<td>47 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any failure (n=129)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>13 (52%)</td>
<td>2 (8%)</td>
<td>6 (24%)</td>
<td>3 (12%)</td>
<td>25 (20%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05 ** p<.01

Disclosures were made about twice as often for those with child victims (63, 49%) as for those with adult victims (29, 23%) or those with non-contact offences (37, 29%). However, the spread of offender types was broadly similar across the five boroughs.

There were significant differences between the boroughs in terms of risk level, as measured by the Risk Matrix 2000 ($X^2$ 23,075, df 12, p<.05): Borough B and Borough D

8 Total on Sex Offender Register (SOR) as at December 2014.
made disclosures on a much greater number of very high risk offenders, while Borough A and Borough E made the most disclosures on low risk offenders. There were also significant differences between the boroughs in terms of the MAPPA level at which the offenders (for whom there was a disclosure) were being managed ($X^2 = 27.540$, df 4, $p<0.01$): Borough E and Borough D managed nearly all the disclosures at Level 1, while Borough A managed the majority at Level 2. There were no significant differences in relation to risk between offender types.

There were 47 (36%) offenders on Sex Offences Prevention Orders (SOPOs), with a proportionally greater number in Borough A although this was not a significant difference ($p<.09$). Although there were no significant differences in the number of SOPOs by offence type, there were significant differences in relation to risk level ($X^2 = 12,987$, df 3, $p<.01$): 11 (52%) low risk, 8 (18%) medium risk, 10 (30%) high risk, and 16 (62%) very high risk offenders were on SOPOs.

For 10 of the 129 disclosures (8%), either the method of disclosure or the outcome was unknown, and these cases were therefore excluded from the following analysis. By far the most disclosures were made in the domain of relationships, and training was the least common domain. Overall the most common method was for the police to telephone the disclosure recipient (22, 19%) or to visit and disclose ((47, 40%). However, in terms of relationships, almost half the disclosures were made by the offender informing the recipient first and this being followed up by the police and confirming the disclosure. Table 2 provides more detailed findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Method of disclosure and outcome in relation to disclosure domains</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Method of disclosure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police - by telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police - by visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offender only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offender, then police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrew</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Disclosures and outcomes**

**Employment**

There were 20 disclosures to potential or actual employers, two thirds of which resulted in rejection of the offender. Within the sample, only one offender (out of 29) with adult victims had an employment disclosure, and he was accepted. Fifteen (out of 62, 24%) disclosures were in relation to offenders with child victims, of whom 60% were rejected; all six (out of 37) of the non-contact offenders were rejected. Offenders were no more successful in applying to work for charitable organisations (paid and unpaid) than for private companies.
Training
Disclosures were evenly spread across offender types. Twenty-two percent of offenders were rejected by training establishments, either by withdrawing an offer, or by not responding following the disclosure. There was no difference in outcome in relation to how the disclosure was made.

Relationships
Disclosures were evenly spread across offender types. Two thirds of offenders (44, 67%) were accepted by those to whom the disclosure was made, and a further 3 (5%) were accepted with conditions, usually regarding supervised contact with their children. However, 19 (29%) were rejected following the disclosure. Forty of the disclosures were to partners (including ex-partners) or the offender’s children; the rest were made to friends and close family members with children. Offenders were half as likely to be rejected (37% versus 63%) if the offender disclosed first rather than the police ($X_2 = 15.395, df = 6, p < .05$).

Social
Disclosures were evenly spread across offender types. These disclosures were to situations regarding shared housing, schools, churches and clubs. Overall around half resulted in rejections although the disclosure was significantly more likely to result in acceptance if the offender disclosed first ($X_2 = 15.395, df = 6, p < .05$).

Further analysis of the data to explore the possible relationships between the method of disclosure, disclosure domain, outcome and risk level did not result in any significant findings.

Offence failures
Overall, there were 25 (20%) failures, in terms of re-arrest or recall, following the disclosure, but within the study period. However, these failures were linked to 20 offenders, as one offender failed after two disclosures, and another offender failed after five different disclosures. There was one re-arrest for a sexual offence, and one for a violent offence; there were five general (acquisitive) re-offences, three for failing to re-register/breach of notification requirements, and seven breaches of SOPO. Three further offenders were recalled without any re-arrest for a further offence. There were no significant differences between offender types and failure overall, although there was a significant difference in the way in which offender types failed ($X_2 = 21.161, df = 10, p < .05$): 75% of those failures with adult victims breached their SOPO, and 44% of failed non-contact offender generally re-offended. Although the numbers were very small, the one violent failure and all three of the recalls had been rejected following disclosures. The most significant association with failure was the risk level ($X_2 = 7.685, df = 3, p < .05$): 2 (10%) of failures were low risk, 3 (8%) medium risk, 8 (24%) high risk, and 7 (28%) of failures were very high risk. Furthermore, 7 (64%) of those on a SOPO failed by breaching their order ($X_2 = 11.380, df = 5, p < .05$).

Offenders were significantly more likely to fail following disclosure to employment if the police made the disclosure first ($X_2 = 16.232, df = 4, p < .01$). There were no significant findings in relation to disclosure method and failure in the other domains. However, those
offenders who were rejected by training establishments were significantly more likely to fail ($X^2 = 9,000$, df 2, $p<.05$).

**Discussion**

This paper presents the results of a descriptive study into the frequency and nature of third party disclosures on RSOs in five London boroughs, with reference to the method of disclosure, the outcome, and subsequent offence failures. The overall aim was achieved, providing data which can serve as a benchmark for other MAPPA areas in London and further afield.

There were some methodological limitations to the study. First, the official records were not entirely accurate, in terms of the VISR system, and although the police teams clearly had a good grasp of their caseload, some disclosures may have been missed. Furthermore, there seemed to be no routine recording within the probation electronic record of disclosures, and there was an impression that the probation service were only leading on disclosure decisions in a minority of cases (18 out of the 129). It is not clear whether this accurately reflects practice, but may raise questions as to whether probation staff should be leading such decisions where the offender is under their statutory supervision.

The decision to disclose, and the outcome of disclosure may have been related to factors not picked up in this study, such as the non-compliance of the offender, or the inappropriateness of the life domain in which they wished to participate. The study can make no judgment on the appropriateness or otherwise of the decision to disclose. The findings should therefore be interpreted with caution, and require further exploration.

Nevertheless, some interesting differences and associations were found. The boroughs were not identical in their practice, with one borough making twice as many disclosures during the study period as any of the other boroughs, despite no discernible difference in risk levels; and another borough managed the majority of disclosures at MAPPA level 2 as compared to the other boroughs who were making decision at level 1. The MAPPA Guidance (2012) suggests that disclosure decisions should be made at a level 2 meeting, although in reality, the lead agency may consider it more expedient to make decisions and carry out the actions without reference to the multi-agency setting.

The tentative hypothesis that disclosures would be more likely to be made on higher risk RSOs was only partially borne out, with a significant number of low risk RSOs in two boroughs also being subject to disclosure. Similarly, there were significantly more SOPOs (in the disclosure group) in the low and the very high risk category, as compared to the medium and high risk categories. These findings suggest that there is a group of low risk offenders who are subject to stringent risk management arrangements. Without further information, it is not possible to know whether this relates to the particular living circumstances of the offender - perhaps a family setting with available child victims - or different professional practices across boroughs.
Disclosures were made twice as often on offenders with child victims than for those with adult victims or non-contact offences. Again, it is difficult to draw conclusions without knowing the proportion of offender types on the SOR; however, there were no differences in risk level across offender types, and it may therefore reflect a greater focus on those with child victims, mirroring public concerns.

The suggestion that disclosures would result in rejection was also only partially borne out. As might be expected, the greatest number of disclosures were made in the relationships domain, but this was also the category most likely to lead to acceptance. This may be of some reassurance to offenders who fear rejection within relationships as a result of disclosure. However, the protective quality of these relationships was not investigated in this study, and there is the possibility that the acceptance into relationships led, in some cases, to further involvement from social services. Although training was the least common domain, the outcomes were also encouraging with around 80% acceptance. The caveat to this is that those who were rejected from training establishments were significantly more likely to fail than those accepted.

The picture was least encouraging with the employment domain, and to some extent, the social domain, with relatively high levels of rejection. This may represent the appropriate management of high risk situations, but raises the possibility that RSOs are encountering obstacles which may not always be warranted, when seeking the social capital (i.e. the ‘new me’ roles) which is central to a model of desistence from offending. Potential employers, charities, clubs, churches and housing associations may not have any significant investment in tolerating or managing risk in the current climate of public concern.

The rate of offence failure (20%) during the study period seemed to be rather high, although only one offender was re-arrested for a sexual offence. Half of the offence failures related to breaches of statutory requirements (SOPOs and SOR notification). In particular the majority of offenders with adult victims breached their SOPO, and almost half the non-contact offenders were re-arrested for general offences. This raises the possibility that these were particularly non-compliant or antisocial offenders; an interesting question is whether disclosures tended to target less compliant offenders, whether less compliant offenders were more likely to be alienated by the disclosure process, or an element of both.

The disclosure method yielded some interesting findings which may have implications for practice. Although not a universal finding, it would appear that when the offender was able to make the disclosure first - followed up by the police - the acceptance rate was significantly improved, particularly in the relationships and social domains. Furthermore, when the police initiated disclosure in the employment domain, this was significantly associated with subsequent offence failure. This suggests that allowing the offender opportunities to initiate the process of disclosure may improve the offender’s sense of control, and enhance the willingness of the person/organisation to whom the disclosure is made, to be accepting. However, not surprisingly, the most robust association with offence failure was the risk level, which provides some additional reassurance that the RM2000 is a reasonable tool for use by MAPPA agencies.
The implications of this study for future research and practice fall into two broad areas:

- Replicating the investigation with a larger sample across London or in less urban environments, in order to explore further the decisions to disclose, and their positive impact in terms of effective risk management, reduced offence failures and increased community reintegration.

- Investigating the emerging possibility that it might be feasible to improve social integration and acceptance by developing a good practice model for carrying out disclosure - including allowing the offender to make the disclosure first - which could be further evaluated.

Disclosure remains an important and potentially powerful tool for effective risk management. Public protection and the needs of victims should always be the priority. However, this study provides an opportunity to ensure that disclosure decisions are consistent across areas and between agencies, and raises opportunities to enhance good practice models which have positive outcomes for both offenders and victims.
Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the London MAPPA Strategic Management Board (SMB) in conducting this research, and to thank the Metropolitan Police teams who gave their time to engage with the study.
References


Spending Review and Autumn Statement on prisoner rehabilitation and the prison estate

On 9 November, 2015, the Chancellor George Osborne set out the priorities of the Spending Review and Autumn Statement. Stating that economic security, national security and opportunity are “intrinsically connected” to sound public finances, the Chancellor identified the Prison Service as being a service badly in need of reform. Two areas for improvement were focused upon in particular: rehabilitation, and the prison estate. On rehabilitation, the Statement read that:

When people are in prison, they are in the care of the state. We have their attention 24 hours a day; we dictate what they do and how they do it. It’s a chance to change their lives for the better. Yet, we hardly do anything. We lock them up, then let them out, and all too often they return to a life of crime.

Crucial to the reform of rehabilitation is the modernisation of the prison estate, described by the Chancellor as “soulless”, “bleak”, “squalid” and “overcrowded”. To this end, it was announced that:

We will start to close some of our old and outdated prisons in city centres, and sell the sites for housing. In their place, we will build nine new prisons – all of which are modern, suitable and support rehabilitation. Four will be completed by 2019-20, the rest soon after. These more efficient prisons will save us £80 million in running costs alone... I can confirm the first prison we will sell is Reading prison.

Criticisms of the proposals, as voiced by penal reform organisations, have focused on the need to invest savings from closing prisons in affordable housing for the public (the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies) or effective community sentences (the Prison Reform Trust) rather than new prisons and more prison places.

George Osborne’s speech setting out his priorities for the Spending Review: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/george-osborne-sets-out-his-priorities-for-the-spending-review
Secure Training Centres in the News

Medway Secure Training Centre
A BBC Panorama programme, aired on the night of 11 January 2016, has revealed staff deliberately hurting and mistreating children at the G4S run Medway Secure Training Centre. Undercover footage showed a 14 year old boy being restrained by up to four male officers, and another teenager being restrained by squeezing his windpipe and using a fork to stab him in the leg. The programme also included footage of staff boasting about hurting youngsters; and presented evidence that such actions had deliberately been covered up and records falsified in order to avoid investigation. Following criticism by the shadow justice minister, Andy Slaughter, as well as several penal reform organisations, four employees have since been sacked and a further three suspended. In a statement, Paul Cook, managing director for G4S Children’s Services said he was shocked and appalled by the allegations and that “clearly this type of alleged behaviour has no place in any of our institutions”. However it has subsequently emerged that G4S wrote to the BBC to try to prevent the broadcast of the film arguing that the filming was 'unauthorised' and 'illegal'.

The Panorama film is available to view on BBC iPlayer, available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b06ymzly/panorama-teenage-prison-abuse-exposed

Hassockfield Secure Training Centre
On Wednesday 21 October 2015, The Guardian reported that the Ministry of Justice had paid the private security company Serco £1.1m for running the Hassockfield Secure Training Centre for seven weeks while it was empty and had been closed down. The contract for running the Centre was extended until 9 January, 2016, although the Centre was closed on 20 November 2015 and the children transferred or released. Meg Hillier, chair of the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee commented:

This is right out of Yes Minister. Even if some of the cost was for security of an empty building it suggests there was little planning by the MoJ about what to do once the last child had left.

In response, an MoJ spokesperson said: “The closure of Hassockfield Secure Training Centre was concluded efficiently…”

The Guardian article is available at:

Understanding desistance from sexual offending: A thematic review of research findings
Farmer et al. review research findings regarding desistance from sexual offending, about which relatively is known compared to the wider desistance literature. They interviewed
32 individuals, each of whom had at least one conviction for sexual offences against children. The paper explores the “structural and the cognitive changes associated with desistance from sexual offending against children” (p.322) with potentially important implications for policy and practice concerning sex offender risk assessment, treatment and management. The authors’ goal “…was to better understand how they were able to desist from re-offending, exploring both the social context of their post-conviction lives and, in particular, their cognitive framing of this context” (p.323).

The authors outline a number of emerging themes. Desistance for the sexual offenders in their study seemed to be rather different from patterns of desistance observed for non-sexual crime. Overall, they were not a group of people with significant histories of antisocial behaviour. In their narratives, they portrayed their offending and motivation for offending as situational and temporary. Unlike many non-sexual offenders, they did not portray their desistance as a result of ‘growing up’ or becoming more mature; instead, for the most part, desistance was portrayed as a self-initiated or rational choice about the pros and cons of what they were doing. Many said that the shock of their arrest contributed to the choice they made about continuing with their crime.

The research participants tended to speak positively about their experiences of structured rehabilitation programmes, including probation supervision and sex offender treatment programmes, attributing their ability to maintain desistance to this help. They also had optimistic plans for the future. Although employment and relationships were most important, these factors did not seem to be related to their desistance in the way these things are traditionally understood in desistance research. However, the level of neutralisations employed by the participants seemed to be related to shame about their offending and signalled their attachment to the perceived moral values and social goods of society. This is further demonstrated by the fact that, on the whole, apart from their sexual offending, most of the desisting participants seemed to live conventional (non-criminal) lifestyles involving, in particular, work and relationships.

The authors conclude that whilst most current practice has centred on ‘risk’ factors and examining why sex offenders re-offend, this study “inverted the risk paradigm” (p.332) by seeking to draw out why is it that they don’t. The findings tend to reinforce the importance and usefulness of rehabilitative programmes provided by probation and prison including accredited programme work in supporting narratives of change.

To read the article in full:

Why Probation Matters
Sue Hall in the Howard Journal explains that probation matters because of its role in creating a humane justice system. Hall states that probation’s core values unite the profession and have been sustained through political change. She asserts that the changes brought about by the ‘Transforming Rehabilitation’ were politically driven, did not build
on probation's achievements and were not evidence led. The fragmentation of service provision and removal of the requirement of a unifying probation qualification framework pose serious threats to the profession. Hall suggests that The Probation Institute will be important in maintaining professional identity and standards. She also states that they may wish to consider that evidence from international experience demonstrates the negative impact of privatisation if values are secondary to profit.

To read the article: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/hojo.12135/abstract

**HM Inspectorate Probation: Transforming Rehabilitation – Early Implementation**

HM Inspectorate of Probation has published a fourth report on the early implementation of the government’s Transforming Rehabilitation programme. The report, *Transforming Rehabilitation – Early Implementation 4: an Independent Inspection of the Arrangements for Offender Supervision*, relates to findings from inspections undertaken in July and August 2015. Inspectors focused on work undertaken at the point of sentence and allocation by the National Probation Service (NPS), work undertaken by the Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) and the NPS to manage offenders, and the interfaces between the two organisations. This included work with those released on licence.

The report contains new recommendations, relative to earlier reports in the series, that the NPS should take action to improve the availability of information provided by other agencies to ensure as much of the Case Allocation System can be completed prior to allocation of the case. It recommends that CRCs should ensure that the first arranged appointment with people on an order takes place at the earliest opportunity, that there is sufficient focus on the achievement of behavioural changes required to reduce the likelihood of reoffending and that in all cases where required there is a sufficient review of the risk of harm assessment and management plan. Both the NPS and CRCs should ensure that in all relevant cases sufficient progress is made to reduce those factors making the offender more likely to reoffend.


**Calls for Better Courts**

A report by the Centre for Justice Innovation published in December, calls for greater use of specialist courts, including those focusing on domestic abuse. Based on existing examples of court practice, 'Better Courts' offers a vision for how courts can improve their contribution to cutting crime.

The publication argues that courts can be faster, fairer, more authoritative and more people focused. Following analysis of the international evidence base, and a 12-month
investigation into innovative practice in the UK, the report highlights case studies of better court innovation and explores the lessons they have for the future reform of the courts of England and Wales. For example, the report identifies examples of courts that are:

- Saving time by diverting low-level anti-social behaviour cases into community-led restorative justice panels;
- Improving victims’ experiences and making more effective decisions by specialising in certain types of issue such as domestic violence or drug addiction;
- Providing at-court support and advice services to help their users access support with issues like mental health, addiction debt or housing;
- Making faster and more effective decisions by taking new approaches to pre-sentence assessments of offenders;
- Expanding and improving their on-going supervision of offenders;
- Delivering swift and certain enforcement of court orders.

To read the Better Courts report in full: [http://www.justiceinnovation.org/node/76/](http://www.justiceinnovation.org/node/76/)

_**Locked Out - Children’s experiences of visiting a parent in prison**_

*Locked Out*, a report published in December 2015 by the children’s charity Barnardo’s, says 17,000 children a month visit a parent in prison. Each week, children make nearly 10,000 visits to public prisons. The report’s authors made four visits to three prisons – HMP Buckley Hall, HMP Erlestoke and HMP Guys Marsh – to observe visits, and heard the views of about 25 children and six mothers both individually and in small groups.

The report notes that the children and parents they spoke with seek relatively small changes to the system to help improve family life. The children wanted to gain more from the relationship that they have with the parent in prison.

Some prisons, for example HMP Parc in South Wales, approach family visits as a valuable resource in the resettlement of offenders. They view visits as a family intervention, rather than a security risk or a privilege that can be sanctioned. Barnardo’s encourages this ethos. As well as improving outcomes for offenders and benefiting the prison, it is more positive for children. Elsewhere, changes to the incentives and earned privileges (IEP) scheme mean that prison visits are being used as a way to enforce discipline.

To read *Locked Out* in full: [https://www.barnardos.org.uk/locked-out-report.pdf](https://www.barnardos.org.uk/locked-out-report.pdf)

_**Digging into the data on crime and punishment**_

In a blog post for the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay argues that community punishments and prison have something in common: neither of them have a significant impact on crime rates.

Using a large dataset on recorded crime in England and Wales over a 20 year period, they found some interesting patterns. First, apart from violence against the person, detection
rates have a crime lowering effect for all crime categories; policing activity seems to matter.

However, in general, prison does not do much to reduce crime, though when one considers variations in sentencing length, there is some impact for longer sentences. It fares worst for young people in prison.

The results for non-custodial sentences were found to vary: for juveniles, non-custodial sentences also do not seem to work, but for adults they seem to be effective in reducing violence against the person and sexual offences. The analysis cannot answer questions such as how effective probation is for or how well supervised community punishments are. However, as it currently stands while non-custodial sentences do not have a huge impact on crime, neither does prison. This was found to be particularly true for younger people in conflict with the law.

The results around youth offending are of particular note and suggests we must move beyond debating the effectiveness of post-crime interventions. Bandyopadhyay argues that if being in contact with the criminal justice system increases criminal activity, we need to look at how to prevent youth from coming into such contact in the first place. The broad criminal justice model that criminalises youthful activity must be reconsidered, along with a more positive agenda that can help divert youth from pursuing a criminal career.

To read the blog post *Digging into the data on crime and punishment* in full: [http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/resources/digging-data-crime-and-punishment](http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/resources/digging-data-crime-and-punishment)

**Annual youth justice statistics collated by the Youth Justice Board**

The Youth Justice Board (YJB) published their annual statistics at the end of January. These look at the English and Welsh Youth Justice System (YJS) in 2013/14 in terms of the number of young people in the system, their offences, outcomes and the trends over time.

Latest available arrests data (for the 2012/13 financial year) shows that 10-17 year olds accounted for 126,809 arrests, or 11.8 per cent of the 1.07 million arrests for notifiable offences in England and Wales. The 10-17 year old age group comprises 10.5 per cent of the total population of England and Wales. The number of arrests of young people has fallen by 24 per cent between 2011/12 and 2012/13. This continues the downward trend seen since the peak in arrests in 2006/07.

The YJB’s statistics show similar reductions for the number of first time entrants (FTEs) to the Youth Justice System and to the number of young people sentenced in 2013/14. The number of young people sentenced to immediate custody fell by 21 per cent from 2,815 in 2012/13 to 2,226 in 2013/14. This number has fallen by 65 per cent since 2003/04, when there were 6,288 young people sentenced to immediate custody.
However, despite these reductions, the statistics also show that in the year ending March 2015 there were 1,315 recorded incidents of self-harm in custody. Although this is marginally fewer than the previous year when there were 1,318 cases, the fact that numbers of young people in custody have been falling mean that in 2014/15 there were 7.7 incidents per 100 young people each month in 2014/15 compared with 6.6 in 2013/14. In 2012/13 there were 5.2 incidents of self-harm per 100 young people each month.

In 2014/15 there were a total of 4,837 restraints – the equivalent of 28.2 each month per 100 young people in custody, similar to the previous year. In the year ending March 2015 a total of 106 incidents of restraint resulted in a reported injury requiring medical treatment. There were also five incidents where the injury was so serious that hospital treatment was required.


**Inside Out: The role of the voluntary and private sector in providing opportunities for rehabilitation for people on temporary release**

Clinks and Prison Reform Trust have jointly produced report on Release On Temporary Licence (ROTL), published in January 2016. The report is based on a survey of voluntary and private sector providers of ROTL placements in the community. It finds that recent changes to the ROTL policy have negatively impacted on the ability of voluntary and private organisations to provide work experience opportunities for people on temporary release. Ministry of Justice statistics reveal a significant fall in the use of ROTL since the review of the policy was announced (by then justice secretary, Chris Grayling) in 2013. Between April and June 2015, there were 83,019 releases on temporary licence from prisons in England and Wales, a decrease of 41% since July – September 2013. This has the potential to be a barrier to effective rehabilitation by reducing employment and resettlement opportunities for people being released from prison.

The report explains that for many people in prison, particularly those who are serving long sentences, the chance to experience ROTL is a key stage in the preparation for their safe release. It enables people to gain training and education, sort out jobs and housing and establish contact with their families, all of which helps them to reduce their risk of reoffending. The report also outlines the relatively very low risk associated with prisoners offending on ROTL: “Less than 1% of releases on temporary licence fail, and, of these, only 6.1% involve an arrestable offence. This is the equivalent of five arrests per 100,000 releases” (p.1).

Other key points listed in the report:

- Respondents are confident that ROTL provides significant benefits both to people in prison and to the organisations that provide placements.
Almost two-thirds (65%) had seen a decrease in ROTL with some organisations reporting that their ROTL placements had “completely stopped” or become “almost impossible”.

Four fifths of respondents (79%) said that it now takes longer to get ROTL placements confirmed.

68% said that prisoners reported difficulties getting their applications for ROTL approved.

More than half (51%) said that their experience of contact and liaison with prisons about ROTL placements had got worse.

37% said that the changes to ROTL were not explained to them at all with a further 29% saying that the explanation was unclear.

Voluntary sector organisations were more likely than private companies to have seen a decrease in the number of ROTL placements and were more than twice as likely to report that their experience of contact and liaison with prisons had got worse.

The report concludes with recommendations for the future, as part of the governments’ review of ROTL. The recommendations include reversing the decline in the use of ROTL, reducing unnecessary obstacles and delays, improving communication and co-ordination between prisons and providers of ROTL placements, improve consistency in the application of the ROTL policy by prisons and support providers of ROTL placements more effectively.

The National Offender Management Service (NOMS) has announced its intention to conduct a review of ROTL policy. The Secretary of State for Justice has indicated the scope for changes in the use of ROTL as part of the government’s review of education in prisons, conducted by Dame Sally Coates.


**Dangerous associations: Joint enterprise, gangs and racism**

An analysis of the processes of criminalisation of Black, Asian and minority ethnic individuals

The Centre for Crime and Justice Studies produced a Research Findings publication analysing the processes of criminalisation for black, Asian and minority ethnic individuals, authored by Patrick Williams and Becky Clarke. The report is a collaboration between Black Training and Enterprise Group (BTEG), the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies (CCJS) and Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association (JENGbA) and Manchester Metropolitan University.
Joint enterprise is a doctrine of common law that has been developed by the courts in cases where more than one person is to be prosecuted for the same offence. The report states that:

*It has emerged as a prosecution tool for the collective punishment of groups where it can be proved that the suspects were ‘in it together’. Controversially, it applies even where the suspects may have played different roles and in many cases, where a suspect was not in the proximity of the offence committed. Intrinsic to the application of the doctrine is the principle of ‘common purpose’ where it is alleged individuals have conspired to commit a crime together.* (p.7)

The report highlights three key themes which reflect the dangerous associations that can be formed between the doctrine of ‘joint enterprise’, the construction and racialisation of the ‘gang’, the ‘gang’ discourse and the notion of foresight that is central to joint enterprise prosecutions.

That concludes that:

...responding to serious youth violence through the 'gang' construct is deeply flawed and likely to be unsuccessful. The perpetration of violence is not aligned to 'race' or ethnicity in ways that are imagined by the current strategies deployed to identify, police and prosecute violent individuals. The findings point to a need to examine and respond to the drivers of violence and harm outside of the contemporary UK 'gangs' discourse.

To read *Dangerous associations: Joint enterprise, gangs and racism* in full:

**Prime Minister’s speech on prison reform**

On 8th February 2016 David Cameron became the first Prime Minister in over 20 years to make a speech focusing on prison reform. After setting out the need for prisons and punishment, the Prime Minister set out his strong belief that “we must offer chances to change” hope for those seeking to change and that “we should help those who’ve made mistakes to find their way back onto the right path”.

Cameron spoke of the failure of the current system with its high levels of re-offending, violence, self-harm and suicide. He stated that the “cycle of re-offending costs up to £13 billion a year” and that the system needs “wholesale reform”. He explained that the government had cut crime in the last five years whilst keeping the prison population largely flat.

He re-stated his commitment to deporting foreign national offenders and said that we need to record prisoners’ nationality earlier in the criminal justice process to aid this. He said that the government will now “legislate to give the police new powers to require
foreign nationals to hand over their passports, and make them declare their nationality in court”.

Cameron outlined four general rules for reform:
1. Give much greater autonomy to the professionals who work in our public services, and allow new providers and new ideas to flourish.
2. Hold providers and professionals to account with real transparency over outcomes.
3. Intervene decisively and dramatically to deal with persistent failure, or to fix the underlying problems people may have.
4. Use the latest behavioural insights evidence and harness new technology to deliver better outcomes.

He announced £1.3 billion of government money to knock some “ageing, ineffective” prisons down and build nine new ones, including five during this Parliament.

He also focused on education provision and the (lack of) educational attainment by people in prison:

Over 50% of prisoners have the English and maths skills of a primary school child. Many have learning difficulties. But at the moment, governors have almost no control over who their education provider is, or what is taught. We have only four organisations nationally who provide education in prisons, and the way these services are organised is not producing anything like the results we need.

Other announcement in the speech included:
• Full co-commissioning for governors and NHS England, to allow prison leaders to have more say in the kind of health services their prisoners receive. This will begin in reform prisons and, if successful, will apply nationwide from 2017, underpinned by new legislation in the Prisons Bill.
• In the context of “tackling extremism”, a new prison-based programme for countering the “non-violent extremism” that can lead to terrorism, together with “mandatory de-radicalisation programmes” for the most serious cases.
• ‘Swift and certain’ sentencing to deal with drug offenders.
• A joint working group to examine how to deliver problem-solving courts in England and Wales.
• Expanding the use of alcohol monitoring tags, which enforce drinking bans for those offenders convicted of alcohol-related crimes.
• New pilots for satellite tracking tags later this year (especially for women), rolling out across the country before the end of the Parliament.
• Advocating, a ‘ban the box’ approach to disclosure at application stage for people with criminal records who are applying for jobs. The Civil Service will be ‘banning the box’ for their initial recruitment stages.

The Prime Minister’s rhetoric on wanting “prisons to be places of care, not just punishment”; was generally well received. However, some questioned the ideology
behind the words and where it would lead a prison system savaged by financial cuts in recent years. For example, Richard Garside, Director of the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, said:

[The] proposed reforms are about the expansion and privatisation of criminal justice, rather than being a serious attempt to address the problems in our criminal justice system, or society more widely. They repeat many old mistakes, while adding some new ones.

The Prime Minister’s speech on prison reform can be read in full at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prison-reform-prime-ministers-speech

**Review of the Youth Justice System: Interim report of emerging findings**

In September 2015, the Justice Secretary, Michael Gove, ordered a review of the youth justice system. The review is being undertaken by Charlie Taylor and is due to be published this Summer.

Mr Taylor has published an interim report of emerging findings (9 February 2016). The main point is that the youth justice system would be more effective and better able to rehabilitate young people if education was at its heart. Taylor argues that young people in conflict with the law should serve their sentences in secure schools rather than youth prisons. Smaller, local, secure schools would draw on educational and behavioural expertise to rehabilitate children and given the skills they need to thrive on release.

- Since 2006/07 the number of children in custody has declined by 64% to its lowest recorded level to around 1,000.
- The result of this drop is that 12 establishments have been closed, but this has been done in a haphazard way with the result that many young people are now living a very long way from home.
- Of those children who remain in custody, most of whom are “more persistent and troubled” offenders, too many – almost two thirds – reoffend within a year of release.
- Around 40% of young people in under-18 Young Offender Institutions (YOIs) have not been to school since they were aged 14, and nearly nine out of 10 have been excluded from school at some point.
- Children in YOIs are only receiving 17 hours of education every week against an expectation of 30 hours.

The report makes four key recommendations:

1. The youth custodial estate needs to be re-designed so that it can cater for a smaller, but more challenging, group of children in custody.
2. Education should be placed at the centre of youth custody, by drawing on the culture of aspiration and discipline which is evident in the best alternative provision schools.
3. Prisons for children should be replaced with smaller secure schools which help children achieve in vocational subjects as well as English and maths, in a more therapeutic environment.

4. Local areas should have greater say in the way children are managed by devolving responsibility, control and money from Whitehall.

The new ‘secure schools’ should be set up in a similar way to alternative provision free schools in England, and located in the regions that they serve. These schools would be inspected under the education framework and held to the same standards as other alternative provision schools. The report states that “rather than seeking to import education into youth prisons, we should create schools for young offenders in which we overlay the necessary security arrangements” (para. 18, p.6).

The report argues that integrating the youth offending service into the local authority’s wider youth services (like Surrey has) helps promote a more comprehensive response to young people who offend and increases the opportunity to divert young people from the youth justice system and into effective services, while allowing greater flexibility in the length and intensity of support provided.

The review of the youth justice system will next focus on the way young offenders are dealt with in court, the available sentences, how to prevent offending in the first place and how to reintegrate children back into the community following custody.


BOOK REVIEWS
Edited by Jake Phillips & Anne Robinson

THE ROUTLEDGE GUIDE TO WORKING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

A dedicated book on careers and employability in criminal justice is overdue and a significant challenge, considering the number of changes in the sector over the past few years and it's continued uncertainty. This well-structured book offers an insight into working in a variety of criminal justice agencies, alongside invaluable career management advice.

This is an ideal text for anyone considering working in the criminal justice sector. The pre-entry advice regarding deciding on higher education routes, and the alternative options (apprenticeships and direct entry are both covered), make this a particularly valuable resource for post-16 transitions for students, teachers, and advisers. The tailored advice for mature students is welcome and there is also very useful information encouraging professional development in work. The guide manages to be comprehensive and realistic, but also inclusive and encouraging. This contributes to a book that should appeal to a wide audience of readers.

Each chapter is well structured making the book ideal for reading in small sections, or for those looking for information on a specific career idea. There are dedicated chapters on the probation service, Police, prisons, the courts, and youth justice, with exhaustive information on the various employment areas within those agencies. Of particular note is the depth of research on each area; organisational information for all jurisdictions in the UK is incorporated and includes values, mission statements and key facts. The perspectives of existing students and professionals are quoted throughout, giving the text the authoritative voice of experience. The book also includes reflection and action points throughout to encourage readers to engage beyond the text. Each chapter outlines specific objectives and includes an excellent summary of content covered, top tips, helpful websites and further reading. As mentioned earlier, the criminal justice sector has undergone major change in the past few years and a downside to including further resources in a book about employability brings with it the danger of those resources going out of date rather quickly.
Chapter four presents some key introductory concepts about becoming more employable. Particularly useful is the inclusion of information about ideas inexperienced readers may not have considered before. There is good advice about demonstrating motivation and commitment, encouraging readers to explore their own interests and explore extra-curricular activities. The hidden jobs market is addressed and comes with some very useful ideas about increasing professional networks. Sector-specific concerns are addressed, such as resilience and its importance when working with vulnerable clients. The authors also encourage the reader to seriously contemplate whether they are motivated towards a career in public service, with realistic information about the sector and some of the practical considerations of working in public service like salary, leave entitlement and job security.

The book concentrates heavily on skills, in line with most employability advice in higher education, and although there is a very comprehensive section in the introduction about how to develop sector-specific skills and how to find voluntary opportunities, ideas about particular activities and volunteering could have been conveyed through the whole book and matched to job areas. I am very pleased to see that reflection about one's values and abilities - a crucial but sometimes ignored process in career management - is encouraged throughout the guide.

Information alone is not adequate for effective career development and career theory promotes the importance of taking action as a means for exploration. Within this book there are suggested 'action points' throughout each chapter. These are frequent and detailed and they include; suggesting websites to visit, encouraging the reader to consider their skills in relevance to the particular job discussed, promoting reflection on the information the book contains, and even suggested activities through social media.

Reflection is also encouraged throughout the text in manageable segments. They are highlighted and boxed throughout, and encourage consideration of a variety of important factors such as; values, abilities, work tasks and pragmatic questions. The reflective tasks are achievable and shouldn’t cause a post-16 student any difficulties. However, consultation with advisers, teachers, or mentors could have been promoted more, especially since the included testimonies from current students and professionals make such a meaningful contribution to the text.

Overall, this book is a fantastic resource for students, advisers and teachers. The authors have made a real effort to be inclusive of learners at different stages of their careers, from school leavers to mature and in-work entrants and students. The text is not only informative, but will encourage and inspire readers to take action and reflect on their development. They have considered the breadth of opportunities not just within the criminal justice sector but related opportunities in law, social work and security. The material is user-friendly, well presented and comprehensive making this an indispensable guide for anyone considering a career in the criminal justice sector.

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OFFENDING AND DESISTANCE: THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

From the “International Series of Desistance and Rehabilitation” which has recently produced such excellent contributions to the literature on Desistance from crime as Deidre Healy’s (2010) “The Dynamics of Desistance: Charting Pathways through change” and Sam King’s (2012) “Desistance Transitions and the Impact of Probation” comes the eighth edition in the series from Beth Weaver who, arguably, is long overdue her own monograph. Offending and Desistance offers an innovative, and (until now) largely untold account of the influence of co-offending peer groups on both offending and desistance from crime. The book covers the life histories of 6 men who were part of a larger group called “the Del” who resided in the Scottish town of “Coaston”. Through a combination of Archer’s (2010) “morphogenic” approach and internal conversation and Donati’s (2011) “relational theory of reflexivity”, Weaver is able to examine the importance of social relations in either enabling or constraining desistance from crime.

The initial chapters of the book cover the somewhat obligatory content in any volume on desistance. A discussion of how desistance is defined, made arguably unavoidable since Laub and Sampson’s challenge that “some researchers do not define desistance but purport to study it” (2001: 8), and a discussion of theories of desistance make up the first substantive chapter of the text. The analysis however makes somewhat of a refreshing divergence from the standard trilogy of “ontogenic”, “sociogenic” and “narrative” paradigms. The author separates the literature into “individual and agentic theories”, “social and structural theories”, “interactionist theories” and “situational theories”. The real innovation of Weaver’s work however lies in the theoretical framework she adopts in her research.

Desistance research, until recently, has been caught up in a discussion of “structure” and “agency” in the desistance process, with interactionist theories suggesting that desistance might, in fact, best be achieved through an interaction of both. While this is useful in some respects it still represents a rather individualistic conception of desistance, with the individual agent becoming involved in social structures which may, or may not, have an impact upon their desistance transitions dependent upon the value attached to these structures. While there is a degree of utility here it has also caused somewhat of a stagnation in desistance research. The author argues that there remains a limited understanding of how social structures shape decisions “ignoring how the individual-in-relation perceives and responds to such influences” (pp.234). This is where the theoretical framework adopted for the research is particularly illuminating. By combining Archer’s (2010) morphogenic approach and her discussion of the internal conversation with Donati’s relational sociology generally and his discussion of relational reflexivity more specifically, Weaver is able to examine how desistance is co-produced by individuals “in relation” through the process of reflexivity and, in doing so, is able to obtain a deeper understanding of the nuances of the lived experiences of desistance than we have perhaps been able to previously. Through an analysis of the life stories of the 6 men from the Del, Weaver argues that “desistance is variously enabled or constrained by the interaction of
the social relations of friendship, intimate relations, families of formation and employment as mediated through the lens of an individual’s personal priorities, values, aspirations and relational concerns” (pp.234).

The life histories provided to illustrate the importance of these interactions are particularly illuminating. Following the stories of Seth, Harry, Jed, Jay, Evan and Andy, through family formations (and break ups), relocation from Coaston, employment and training, discovering religion and their numerous interactions with the criminal justice system gives us a detailed understanding of the (typically messy) process of desistance from crime. These discussions also question pre-existing understandings of capital, agency, identity and reflexivity. For the sake of clarity, each case study is linked back to the theoretical framework used throughout the research which, although at times feels a little repetitive, is nonetheless important in order to understand the nuances of each offender desistance process.

Without question this volume is of great importance in furthering our understanding of the lived experience of desistance. While there are times where the explanation of the theoretical framework requires several readings (which may perhaps be a little off putting for undergraduate students coming to desistance from crime afresh), the pay of for this is considerable. Weaver provides a discussion of desistance from crime which is both theoretically and methodologically innovative and must be commended for producing a volume which will become a key reading for anyone interested in the study of desistance from crime.

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References
RESPONDING TO HATE CRIME: THE CASE FOR CONNECTING POLICY AND RESEARCH

This edited collection is a much needed addition to the literature on the contentious notion of hate crime, which is essential reading an academic audience as well as policy makers and practitioners. A lot of previous work has concentrated on definitional issues and making a persuasive argument for analysing the characteristics and consequences of hate crime in terms which clearly differentiate it from other crime types. There has been some resistance to this view but, amongst other things, this book rebuts the claims of these sceptics. This volume is set apart from much of what has already been published by its key premise of considering hate crime not just as a matter for academic researchers but also a problem requiring creative and effective policy interventions. Indeed the main unique selling point of the book is its focus on the synergy between scholarship and policy, and its commitment to promoting the application of knowledge about hate crime to reduce offending and to ameliorate its impact on victims. Chakraborti and Garland have done a commendable job of bringing together academics, policy makers and activists and the outcome is an accomplished piece of work that identifies what needs to be done about hate crime.

The book consists of three sections. In the first part (‘Working together: developing shared perspectives’) the contributors examine the nature of the partnerships that bind together work undertaken in scholarly and policy domains, outlined in a thoughtful piece written by Hall. The other chapters refer to issues such as policing (Giannasi), the work of the Sophie Lancaster Foundation (Lancaster) and sex work (Campbell); the latter two being issues that are relatively marginal to current debates about hate crime. There is an honest account of the tensions that sometimes exist – arguably less so today than in the past – between university based researchers and those behind the making, and implementation, of policy, captured well by Giannasi. In this section a powerful argument is also made to recognise the importance of policy and law both nationally and internationally, the activism of communities and civil society and the work of academics (Perry).

The unifying theme of the second part (‘Researching key issues: emerging themes and challenges’) is ‘the relationship between hate crime research and hate crime policy’ (p6). Duggan explores collaborative work between agencies and the input of academic research to address prejudice and hate directed towards LGB&T communities. Chih Hoong Sin develops a novel framework to explore the ‘layers of influence’ in terms of the interaction between policy, research and practice in relation to disablist hate crime. Racist and religiously motivated hate crime are the focus of chapters by Zempi, Treadwell and Hardy respectively. Zempi examines Islamophobia and how researchers and those involved in the policy domain need to be more responsive to the needs of those who are the victims of this form of hate. Treadwell calls for a more nuanced understanding of police-led solutions to the threats posed by the EDL to community cohesion. Hardy’s notion of ‘everyday multiculturalism’ is utilised to show how individuals opposed to multiculturalism are likely to engage in hate crime that is underpinned by prejudicial attitudes and beliefs.
about race and faith. Michael turns her attention towards the student population suggesting this group is in need of more research due to their victimisation. The final chapter (Mason-Bish) in this part discusses gender, which (with exception of transgendered identities) is not an element of existing hate crime frameworks mainly because, so the argument goes, existing policy and legislation oriented towards violence against women is a sufficient response for this group. Mason-Bish does not claim that gender should be recognised as a strand of hate crime, but by drawing attention to gender she exposes some of the drawbacks of focusing too much on the identity group to which victims belong.

In the third part, which is entitled ‘Challenging prejudice: combating hate crime offending’ there is an exploration of how representatives of different agencies can work together. In Canada Perry and Dyck show how an educational intervention involving agencies, academics and activists can address the homophobic and transphobic crime faced by the LGBT population, particularly by increasing confidence and reporting levels amongst this group. Mason, McCulloch and Maher focus on policing in Victoria, Australia, showing how academic researchers can apply their knowledge to assist the police to respond more effectively to hate crime. James’ research on gypsies and travellers shows that by treating this group as a problem the police underestimate their victimisation, hence the need for research to inform police policy. Iganski and colleagues then consider work with offenders undertaken in the north west of England and suggest that non-punitive work is more likely to reduce offending – and prevent first time offending – than reliance on punishment. The final chapter, authored by Walters, evaluates the potential relevance of restorative justice for changing offenders without resulting in secondary victimisation for those impacted by hate crime. The limitations of restorative justice are acknowledged but a case for recognising the potential for transforming offenders through challenging their conduct is clearly articulated.

The book is a success on a number of levels yet its main strength is that it comes to terms with the complex relationship between research and policy at different levels in response to different problems in the field of hate crime. The authors of each chapter provide research informed analyses of how ideas and practice interact with reference to their more specific concerns. A major achievement of Responding to Hate Crime is that it overcomes some of the challenges posed by identity politics and the claims making of particular groups fighting for recognition (Jacobs and Potter, 1998) and the strategic advantages of being recognised as victim group (Hall, 2013). This is because the contributors share the common goal of working together to address the causes and consequences of prejudice whatever type of prejudice that might be.

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References
WHAT WORKS IN THERAPEUTIC PRISONS: EVALUATING PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGE IN DOVEGATE THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY


A therapeutic community within a prison may sound like a contradiction in terms. This book recounts in detail the purpose, process and outcome of a piece of longitudinal research examining the effects of such a community within Dovegate Prison. As all prison researchers know, there are always compromises to be struck within prison studies; the need for research integrity is invariably superseded by the exigencies of security and of ‘the system’. The authors of this study are impressively open about the accommodations they had to make, and perhaps unnecessarily apologetic about their inability to conduct a 'gold standard' randomised control trial. They set out early on a list of 'controversies' associated with the notion of a therapeutic community within a prison, including in their case the fact that the prison was privately-run and therefore liable to be primarily subject to a profit rather than a therapeutic motive. However, they assessed the goodwill of those involved to be genuine and proceeded accordingly.

The 12 chapters of the book follow the tenets of all good research reports, which is to say that they provide a foundation for the study with competent literature citation, set out the research aims and caveats, describe the comprehensive range of quantitative and qualitative research methods and respondents, explain how the resulting data are analysed, and present the findings with their implications for practice. The challenge of presenting research material in book form, however, is to make it accessible to the non-academic reader, and while the first three and last chapters succeed in doing this, the middle chapters contain some complex tables, diagrams and analyses which the busy professional is unlikely to have the time to absorb. Nevertheless, in fairness, the material also contains regular reference to the experiential responses of the prisoners and these, together with reconviction rates provide a credible flavour of the kinds of changes that have taken place in the men over a 2-year period.

The study drew for its evidence on 375 therapeutic community residents, though not all of these were involved in every data collection method. It is always possible to be critical of research methodology, but aside from noting, as the authors themselves do, that their comparison group of 57 mainstream prisoners from 2 other prisons was of necessity somewhat arbitrary, it would be churlish to do so in the light of such a concerted attempt to gain data from a wide range of sources and methods, comprising case records, leavers’ questionnaires, post-release interviews and case studies, focus groups, adjudications, reconviction rates, and psychometric tests. Like many others, they came up against the difficulty of measuring the less than distinct concept of personality disorder with less than reliable instruments; on the other hand, their mobilisation of attachment theory to measure, via a multiple card sorting procedure, the adaptations and transition experiences of their respondents within and beyond this unusual therapeutic/prison life existence, allowed for some expression of individual constructs over time. Given, though, that some of their respondents recounted for the first time experiences of abuse in
childhood, a common feature of prison studies, it was perhaps surprising that no measure of post-traumatic stress disorder was employed.

So what does work in therapeutic prisons? In essence, the study found that 18 months was the optimum period to spend at Dovegate in order to achieve sustained change, with prisoner-residents becoming more open, confident, reflective and empathetic over time. Those with poor attachment styles, particularly sex offenders, tended to be unable to form the therapeutic alliances with their therapy group, needed to support them to make these changes. This was also true of those deemed to have severe personality disorder. Those who had committed non-sexual or other non-violent offences were more likely to stay longer and do better than their counterparts. These findings have clear implications for selection and residency length.

Perhaps of most interest to policy-makers are the quantitative findings: a marked decrease in adjudications one year after residency as compared with one year before; and a reconviction rate of 47.8%, usually within a year, as compared with other national samples ranging from 54 - 58%, and reflecting a 10% reduction following the therapeutic programme, which other prison treatment programmes have not on the whole provided.

In conclusion, this is a careful and honest account of a painstaking study over a 7-year period. In keeping with its sub-title, it does evaluate psychological change in Dovegate Therapeutic Community but is perhaps a little over-ambitious in generalising its main title to 'What Works in Therapeutic Prisons', when what it has really told the reader is what works in the particular environment that is the Dovegate Prison Therapeutic Community. At the end of the day, however, it is right to remember that the study represents many human stories, told through a range of data, which will variously inform the policy and practice of those seeking effectiveness and crime desistance through prison treatment programmes.

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